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JAMES A. JOHNSON and
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs,
vs.
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah
Corporation and PAT B. BRIAN,

Civil No. 900400460CN

Defendants.
Notice is hereby given that Plaintiffs James A. Johnson and
Jennifer L. Johnson, by and through their attorney, Richard C.
Coxson, appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals the final judgment of
the Honorable Judge Christofferson.
The appeal is taken from the entire judgment,
DATED this - ^ a y of

cA*-*—<

_

, 1993

RICHARD^C'. COXSON
Attorney for Plaintiffs
275 North Main
PO Box 288
Spanish Fork, UT 84660
(801) 798-3574

F ! L F. 0
Fourth Jitf'o-.. TsArlsl Court of
|l|^(l.y:-:V{ ;7''-lJEf UtSll.

Arthur H. Nielsen (2405)
Marilynn P. Fineshriber (4571)
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants Nielsen & Senior
1100 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 532-1900

C A M D.G:OT. Clerk
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES A. JOHNSON and
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON,
ORDER
Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 900400460CN
Judge VeNoy Christoffersen
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah
Corporation, Pat B. Brian,
Defendants.

Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial as to Nielsen & Senior
pursuant to Rule 59, U. R. Civ. P., having been submitted to the
Court for decision and the Court having reviewed the relevant
documents and papers of the respective parties and having
rendered a memorandum decision, now therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial,
pursuant to Rule 59 U. R. Civ. P., be and the same is herebydenied.

21263.NI211.8500

DATED this

/y

r

/ ^ day of June, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable

V^Noy/Chri's^6ffersen

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Richard C. CoxUbn, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

/ £ * day of June, 1993, I

served Defendant's ORDER by causing a true and correct copy of
the same to be sent, through the United States mails, first-class
postage prepaid, to the following:
Richard C. Coxson, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
275 North Main
Spanish Fork, UT 84660
Michael L. Dowdle
Attorney for Defendant Pat B. Brian
915 West 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104
Ql
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IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JAMES A. JOHNSON, and
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiffs,
vs.

NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah
Corporation, and PAT B.
BRIAN,

Civil No. 900400460 CN

Defendants.

Plaintiffs through th

counsel have filed a Motion For New Trial under Rule

59(b) U.R.C.P. The Motion For N«. Trial is based 01. the representations of the plaintiffs that
the defendant intentionally misrepresented facts to the Court even though the Court was a party
thereto and was aware that those facts were intentional misrepresentations.

The facts

intentionally misrepresented are set forth in a deposition of James Johnson and counsel for
plaintiff's, Darwin Fisher. The Court found that the facts concerning the delay of trial were not
misrepresentations by the plaintiff and the Court was certainly not aware of any
misrepresentations if any were made. Plaintiffs had ample' opportunity to file an objection to
the Findings and Conclusions in the Court's Order of Dismissal of this case. They failed to do
so.

Plaintiffs further state that they have moved this case forward and were ready for
trial in November of 1992. This is contrary to the facts since prior to this time Darwin C.
Fisher, who was then attorney for the plaintiff, filed a Motion to Withdraw based on a conflict
of interest and on November 19, 1992, the Court signed a Memorandum Decision granting his
request for withdrawal. Obviously the plaintiffs were not ready for trial as Mr. Richard Coxson
had just entered as attorney for the plaintiff. After this Mr. Coxson filed a Motion for further
discovery, many months after the cut off date for discovery had been ordered and further
represented that he needed this discovery in order to familiarize himself with the case in that he
had just entered the same. Obviously he was not ready for trial at that time, and further the
Court has never refused to set the matter for trial. The plaintiffs' argument on these grounds
falls far short for support of their Motion for a New Trial under Rule 59(b) U.R.C.P. The
Court is not again going to review the factors it set forth in its Memorandum Decision
dismissing this case nor as to the cases supporting those factors and the law in the Court's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Mr. Brian's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion
For New Trial on the grounds of failure to procedurally comply with services is denied on the
grounds that they were served but failure to place their name on the Certificate of Service is not
sufficient grounds. However, the Motion For Dismissal as to Mr. Brian by this Court in its
prior decision will stand.

2il

Counsel for defendants is directed to prepare the appropriate Orders.
DATED this

of/p^-

day of May,

VENOY CWRISTOFpRSON
SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE
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RICHARD C. COXSON (A5933)
Attorney for Plaintiffs
275 North Main
Spanish Fork, UT 84660
(801) 798-3574
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JAMES A. JOHNSON and
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON,

])
]

Plaintiffs,

REPLY MEMORANDUM

]

vs.

]

NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah
Corporation and PAT B. BRIAN,

]i
)1

Civil No. 900400460CN
Judge VeNoy Christoffersen

Defendants.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs have brought this Motion to Set Aside a dismissal
in this action for failure to prosecute in as much as the dismissal
was ill founded and an abuse of discretion.
FACTS
1.

Defendants were substantially at fault for a significant

amount of the delays in this action. See Affidavit of James A.
Johnson.
2.
readiness

Counsel
for

availability

for defendants agreed

trial

for

November

to notify the court of

based

after a phone conversation

upon

their

for prior

calendar

counsel

for

plaintiffs, Darwin Fisher. See Affidavit of Darwin C. Fisher.
3.

Prior counsel for plaintiffs, Darwin C. Fisher, attempted

to verify the trial scheduled for November of 1992 with the court
clerk, and was in fact informed that trial had been set for

210

November of 1992. See Affidavit of Darwin C. Fisher.
4.

It was only just prior to the withdrawal of Darwin C.

Fisher that he became aware that the trial was not scheduled for
November of 1992, and therefore trial setting would not bar his
request for withdrawal of counsel. See Affidavit of Darwin Fisher.
5.
Motion

Defendants have on numerous
for

Dismissal,

Dismissal

and

this

intentionally

Rule

occasions, including
59

misrepresented

Motion
the

to

Set

facts.

the

Aside
Those

misrepresentations include:
a.

the existence of a policy of malpractice insurance;

b.

the actual

ruling made by the Supreme Court with

regard to the Interlocutory Appeal;
c.

the effect of the protective order decisions; and

d.

Judge Pat B. Brian's continued unavailability at

numerous times when requests for discovery were made, which greatly
inconvenienced plaintiffs, but which they acquiesced in simply to
move this action along.
ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs are at present trying to have a dismissal set aside
for failure to prosecute. It is contrary to law in the State of
Utah, and which has been cited in prior memoranda, that a case
which

is

ready

for

trial

should

be

dismissed

for

want

of

prosecution on what is virtually the eve of trial. In this case,
the trial court has abused its discretion and has dismissed a case
which is ready to go to trial, the only reason for which it did not

2
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go to trial

being

the failure of: 1) either the counsel

for

defendants to schedule with the court trial dates in November of
1992 as agreed to and which they made representations that they
would; 2) or the administrative failure of court itself to calendar
the trial. Under the circumstances, it is almost incredible that
plaintiffs should be punished for a failure over which they had
absolutely not control.
When it is further considered that counsels for defendants
have intentionally misrepresented numerous facts in this case, the
representations made by them in their Affidavit attached to the
Memorandum

in Opposition

to

this motion

should

be

completely

discounted due to their lack of credibility. In contract, prior
counsel

for

plaintiffs,

Darwin

Fisher,

has

not

made

any

misrepresentation in this action, nor has he made "self-serving" or
otherwise skewed or false statements. Mr. Fisher's Affidavit is
clear, his recollection is unimpaired, and his statements firmly
support the proposition that Mr. Whyte and Mr. Dowdle took upon
themselves the responsibility in a conference call to set trial for
November 2-13, 1992. It is equally clear that no such action was in
fact taken. Dismissal

should

therefore be

set aside since

no

failure to prosecute has in fact occurred.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Fisher has a very clear recollection of the events, and
has never misrepresented them to the court for any reason. Counsel
for defendants can not make the same claim in as much as they have

3

20

frequently misrepresented facts of many different types throughout
this

action.

Mr.

Fisher's

Affidavit

should

therefore

not

be

stricken, and dismissal should be set aside in as much as there was
not failure to prosecute by plaintiffs.
DATED this /r^day of

/'(0L<^

, 1993.

RICHftKtf C. COXSON
Attorney for Plaintiff
275 North Main
Spanish Fork, UT 84660
(801) 798-3574
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing, postage prepaid to:
Arthur J. Nielsen
Marilynn P. Fineshriber
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorney for Defendants
60 East South Temple
Eagle Gate Tower, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Michael L. Dowdle
Attorney for Defendant Pat B. Brian
915 West 100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84104
A courtesy copy to:
Judge VeNoy Christoffersen
875 Rio Virgin Drive, #217
St. George, UT 84770
DATED this

., 1993.

day of

4
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Arthur H. Nielsen (2405)
Marilynn P. Fineshriber (4571)
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants Nielsen & Senior
1100 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 532-1900

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES A. JOHNSON and
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON,
Plaintiffs,
v.
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah
Corporation, Pat B. Brian,

)
)
|
]|
i

MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANT
NIELSEN & SENIOR IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Civil No. 900400460CN
Judge VeNoy Christoffersen

Defendants.
Defendant Nielsen & Senior submits the following Memorandum
in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial, pursuant to
Rule 4-501, Code of Judicial Administration.
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

This Court made and entered its Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law and entered a Judgment of Dismissal of
Plaintiffs' Complaint pursuant to Rule 41(b), U. R. Civ. P. on
April 6, 1993. Plaintiffs filed no objections to the proposed
Findings and Conclusions, although they later submitted their own
proposed Findings after the Court had entered the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Having failed to take advantage of

the opportunity to object, Plaintiffs now seek to set aside the
Dismissal alleging intentional misrepresentation by Defendants
and complicity by the Court.

Nielsen & Senior denies that it has

made any misrepresentation, and objects to Plaintiffs*
allegations which are not supported by the record and are a
reflection on the integrity of the Court and opposing counsel.
2.

Defendant Nielsen & Senior objects to Plaintiffs'

statement of "Facts Intentionally Misrepresented" in its
entirety.

In many instances, the Affidavit of Darwin Fisher does

not support the facts asserted in Plaintiffs1 Memorandum.

See

the Affidavit of Larry Whyte filed herewith and incorporated
herein.
3.

Defendant Nielsen & Senior objects to the Affidavit of

Darwin C. Fisher and has filed a separate Objection to its
admission on the ground that Mr. Fisher could not testify, if
called, to its contents because the statements are largely
hearsay and inadmissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 802.

In the

event that this Court determines to admit Mr. Fisher's Affidavit,
Nielsen & Senior submits and requests the admission of the
counteraffidavit of Larry L. Whyte.

20246.NI211.8500
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS NO SHOWING OF IRREGULARITIES IN THE PROCEEDINGS
WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY A NEW TRIAL
Rulings on motions for new trials are addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court but, absent a showing of one of the
grounds set forth in Rule 59, U. R. Civ. P., the Court has no
discretion to grant a new trial.

Hancock v. Planned Development

Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 185 (Utah 1990).

Plaintiffs base their

Motion, apparently, on a claim that Defendant Nielsen & Senior
misrepresented facts to the Court so that entry of a judgment of
dismissal based on those facts would constitute an irregularity
entitling Plaintiffs to a new trial.

Plaintiff's submitted

affidavit fails, however, to make the required showing.
In the first instance, there is no evidence of any
irregularity in the briefing of and oral argument on Defendants•
Motion to Dismiss.

In fact, the issues raised by Defendants1

Motion to Dismiss were fully briefed and argued by the parties.
Plaintiffs had full and complete opportunity to object to the
proposed findings, if grounds therefor appeared in the record.
The Judgment of Dismissal was entered after proceedings which
were completely in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil
- Procedure and the Code of Judicial Administration, and Plaintiffs
have made no showing of irregularities.

20246.NI211.8500
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In the second instance, the affidavit of Plaintiffs former
counsel is inaccurate, unsubstantiated, self-serving, and
inadmissible as hearsay under Utah Rule of Evidence 802. As
such, the affidavit does not suffice to establish grounds for a
new trial.

Defendant particularly objects to Mr. Fisher's use of

the November 2, 1992, trial setting to his personal advantage and
then as a basis of accusation against the Court.

Counsel for the

parties discussed a trial setting following the denial of
Plaintiffs' Petition for Interlocutory Appeal, and settled on the
dates November 2-13, 1992.

It was Plaintiffs' obligation to file

with the Court a Pre-trial Order incorporating those dates.
Despite the fact that Defendants drafted several proposed Pretrial Orders and submitted them for Mr. Fisher's review, Mr.
Fisher refused to cooperate and Plaintiffs never submitted to the
Court a Pre-trial Order setting the trial dates.
When Mr. Fisher wished to withdraw as counsel in October,
1992, he relied on the fact that there was no trial setting to
support his claim that there would be no delay of trial by his
withdrawal.

Using his failure to submit a Pre-trial Order to his

advantage one more time, Mr. Fisher's present Affidavit
speciously states that he thought the dates would be given to the
Court and trial setting noticed by the Court.

Based on Mr.

Fisher's Affidavit, Plaintiffs now assert that the "Court

20246.NI211.8500

- 4 -

refused" to set the matter for trial, and that they were at all
times ready to proceed.
These statements by Plaintiffs and their former counsel are
inconsistent and do not provide reliable evidence to support
Plaintiffsf claim of irregularity in the proceedings which
resulted in the entry of the Judgment of Dismissal.
POINT II
THERE IS NO ERROR OF LAW IN THE ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT OF
DISMISSAL WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY A NEW TRIAL
As the second ground for their Motion for New Trial,
Plaintiffs allude to an error in law.

Defendant will not tax the

patience of the Court to review, once again, the factors set
forth in Westinghouse Electrical Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen
Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) and Maxfield v.
Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1989).

The Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law which supported the entry of the Judgment of
Dismissal reveal the ample evidence in the record that Plaintiffs
failed to proceed to prosecute their claims with the diligence
required by the decision of this Court.

By the submission of one

Affidavit, replete with misstated dates and unsubstantiated by
the record. Plaintiffs seek to persuade the Court that there is
insufficient basis to sustain the Judgment.

To the contrary, the

papers and filings of record, including those attached as
exhibits to Mr. Whyte's Affidavit, demonstrate the pattern of
Plaintiffs' conduct with convincing clarity.
20246. N1211.8500
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Plaintiffs1 conduct

is evidenced by every fact of record and supports the Judgment of
Dismissal.

There has been no error of law which would entitle

Plaintiffs to have the judgment set aside.
The Court's decision that the facts of this case warranted
dismissal of the action is buttressed by an April 21, 1993
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals.

See, Country Meadows

Convalescent Center v. Utah Department of Health, Case No.
920302-CA, (a copy of which is attached to this Memorandum).
There the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal for failure
to prosecute based upon Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

The

court's decision acknowledged that "evaluation of a district
court's decision to dismiss for failure to prosecute is fact
sensitive . . . "

Id. at 1# quoting from the prior case of Meadow

Fresh Farms v. Utah State University, 813 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Utah
App. 1991).

Further, the appellate court "will not interfere

with that decision unless it clearly appears that there is a
likelihood an injustice has been wrought."

id. at 3, quoting

Charlie Brown Construction v. Leisure Sports, Inc.f 740 P.2d
1368, 1370 (Utah App. 1987).
Country Meadows argued that dismissal of its case was error
on two grounds, one of which is pertinent to Plaintiffs' present
motion.

Country Meadows claimed that the Defendants' own failure

to move the case forward negated its right to the dismissal.
Court of Appeals determined that it was the conduct of the

20246.NI211.8500
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The

Plaintiff which was to be scrutinized.

"Although inaction on the

part of a defendant may contribute to the justifiability of the
plaintiff's excuse for delay, the duty to prosecute is a duty of
due diligence imposed on a Plaintiff, not on a defendant."

Id.

at 6, quoting Meadow Fresh Farms, 813 P.2d at 1218. Accordingly,
Nielsen & Senior was not required to take the leading role in
moving the case forward and, insofar as Plaintiffs' Facts allege
lack of initiative on Defendants* part, such allegations are
irrelevant.
Country Meadows provides further support for this Court's
dismissal of the case:
In applying the Westinohouse factors, the Utah
Supreme Court required that the "totality of the
circumstances" be considered to determine "[w]hether
delay is a ground for the dismissal of an action."
Department of Social Services v. Romero. 609 P.2d 1323,
1324 (Utah 1980). Therefore, a plaintiff cannot
isolate and argue facts relevant to only one or two of
the Westinghouse factors to avoid its burden "* to
prosecute a case in due course without unusual or
unreasonable delay,'" Meadow Fresh Farms, 813 P.2d at
1218 (quoting Charlie Brown Construction. 740 P.2d at
1370) .
Country Meadows, at 5.
Nielsen & Senior contends that Plaintiffs are attempting
once again to do exactly what the Utah Supreme Court prohibits
above.

Plaintiffs have misstated certain facts regarding

discovery and deposition proceedings in the case and then have
used and re-used those to support their Motion.

The "totality of

the circumstances", however, is borne out by the Affidavit of
20246.NI211.8500
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Larry L. Whyte and the entirety of papers and filings in this
matter.

Under the totality of the circumstances, there is no

error of law in this Court's Dismissal of the case.
CONCLUSION
Defendant Nielsen & Senior submits that there were no
irregularities in the proceedings and that the record before the
Court amply supports the Judgment of Dismissal.

Plaintiffs have

failed to make the necessary showing and, thus, the Court has no
discretion to grant a new trial.

Plaintiffs* Motion should be

denied.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2flHl day of April, 1993.
NIELSEN & SENIOR

r\
^Arthur H. Nielsen
Marilynn P. Fineshriber
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen &
Senior

20246.NI211.8500
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ^^Iday of April, 1993, I
have served Defendants' MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANT NIELSEN & SENIOR
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL by causing a
true and correct copy of the same to be sent, through the United
States mails, first-class postage prepaid, to the following:
Richard C. Coxson, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
275 North Main
Spanish Fork, UT 84660

47lMAJb*toA> ftPlA^/dlAAlv.Mi
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FILED
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter,

Utah Court of Appeals

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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00O00

Country Meadows Convalescent
Center, a Delaware
corporation,
Petitioner and Appellant,

'

OPINION
(For Publication)

Clerkof
ofthe
thA/%*,..*
Clerk
Court

Case No. 920302-CA

V.

F I L E D
( A p r i l 2 1 , 1993)

Utah Department of Health,
Division of Health Care
Financing,
Defendant and Appellee.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
Attorneys:

Dale E. Stratford, Ogden, for Appellant
Jan Graham, Douglas W. Springmeyer, and J.
Stephen Mikita, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and Orme.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Petitioner, Country Meadows Convalescent Center, Inc.
(Country Meadows), appeals the district court's dismissal of its
petition for review of a decision by the Utah Department of
Health (UDOH) and its grant of summary judgment in favor of UDOH.
We affirm the dismissal for failure to prosecute based upon Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
BACKGROUND
Because evaluation of a district court's decision to dismiss
for failure to prosecute is fact sensitive, we present the facts
in some detail. Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State Univ., 813 P.2d
1216, 1219 (Utah App. 1991). In February 1978, Ms. Eva S. Barney
and her son, Carl W. Barney, formed a partnership to build the
Country Meadows Convalescent Center, a nursing home in South
Ogden, Utah, which would provide intermediate and skilled nursing
care to Medicaid recipients. Carl Barney's construction company,

Williams & Peterson, 685 P.2d 538, 538 (Utah 1984). An appellate
court, therefore, "will not interfere with that decision unless
it clearly appears that the court has abused its discretion and
that there is a likelihood an injustice has been wrought."
Charlie Brown Constr.r 740 P.2d at 1370 (citing Department of
Soc. Serv. v, Romero. 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980)).
Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute
On appeal, Country Meadows argues that the district court
erred in dismissing its petition for review on two grounds:
(1) UD0H / s own failure to move the district court appeal forward
negated its right to the dismissal; and (2) the dismissal would
create injustice by substantially prejudicing Country Meadows in
subsequent Medicaid reimbursement matters.2 Having reviewed the
record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in granting UDOH's motion for a dismissal of Country
Meadows' petition, and that the dismissal did not cause
substantial injustice.
UDOH based its motion to dismiss on Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(b) which provides in pertinent part:
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or
to comply with these rules or any order of
court, a defendant may move for dismissal of
an action or any claim of action against him.
Although Utah courts "consider[] a motion to dismiss to be a
severe measure," Burnett v. Utah Power & Light Co., 797 P.2d
1096, 1097 (Utah 1990), Rule 41(b) requires plaintiffs "*to
prosecute their claims with due diligence, or accept the penalty
of dismissal.'" Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure Sports
Inc.. 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 765 P.2d
1277 (Utah 1987) (quoting Maxfield v. Fishier. 538 P.2d 1323,
1325 (Utah 1975)). See also Hill v. Dickerson, 197 Utah Adv.
Rep. 23, 24 (Utah App. 1992). '"Rule 41(b) sets no deadline for
2. In its reply brief, Country Meadows also argued that Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 81(d) would foreclose the option of a Rule 41(b)
dismissal as inconsistent with the "judicial review of a final
determination of the executive director" of a state agency
authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 26-23-1. Because presentation of
this argument in a reply brief does not conform to "Rule 24(c) of
the Appellate Rules of Procedure limit[ing] answers in a reply
brief to new matter in the appellee's brief," we decline to
consider this argument. Larson v. Overland Thrift and Loan, 818
P.2d 1316, 1321 n.5 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 832 P.2d 476
(Utah 1992).

920302-CA

3

P.2d at 879)). See also K.L.C. Inc., 656 P.2d at 988; Utah Oil
Co. v. Harris. 565 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1977).
In applying the Westinahouse factors, the Utah Supreme Court
required that the "totality of the circumstances" be considered
to determine "[w]hether delay is a ground for the dismissal of an
action." Romero, 609 P.2d at 1324. Therefore, a plaintiff
cannot isolate and argue facts relevant to only one or two of the
Westinahouse factors to avoid its burden "*to prosecute a case in
due course without unusual or unreasonable delay,/ff Meadow Fresh
Farms, 813 P.2d at 1218 (quoting Charlie Brown Constr., 740 P.2d
at 1370).
Nevertheless, Country Meadows' argument focuses on just two
of the Westinahouse factors: (1) the injustice which would result
from the dismissal of the case, and (2) UDOH/s failure to
independently move the case forward. Country Meadows points out
that the injustice which might result from a dismissal is the
most important of the Westinahouse evaluative factors. Romero,
609 P.2d at 1324 (discussing Westinahouse, 544 P.2d at 879).
Country Meadows then claims that it would suffer manifest
injustice as a result of dismissal because it refrained from
moving forward on subsequent reimbursement claims submitted to
UDOH, pending resolution of this matter.
However, we do not believe that Country Meadow/s decision to
compound one course of procrastination with another constitutes
the type of injustice intended to be prevented by Westinahouse or
Romero. In fact, even where a trial court finds facts indicating
that "injustice could result from the dismissal of [a] case," it
can dismiss when a plaintiff has "had more than ample opportunity
to prove his asserted interest and simply failed to do so."
Rushton, 779 P.2d at 240. Country Meadows has failed to offer
any persuasive or legitimate reason for failing to take steps to
advance its petition for over five years. It also has not
demonstrated an inability to pursue the delayed reimbursement
claims at this time. Therefore, in reviewing the dismissal of
this case, we are not persuaded that Country Meadows' subsequent
inaction on other reimbursement claims weighs compellingly in
favor of our finding an abuse of discretion by the district
court.
Country Meadows next asks this court to focus on the
behavior of UDOH, claiming that UDOH had "every opportunity to
move the case forward" including the potential to request the
district court to either issue an order to show cause or calendar
a scheduling conference. In support of this argument, Country
Meadows quotes from Romero which noted "the important fact []
that the defendant himself did nothing to move the case forward,
but appears to be quite contented to let it lie dormant."

920302-CA
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inactivity prior to its motion to dismiss do not constitute a
reasonable excuse for Country Meadows' lack of diligence in
pursuing its petition for review. Further, Country Meadows' nonaction for over five years indicates that the district court did
not act unreasonably or arbitrarily in dismissing this action.
When a "trial court has provided plaintiffs %an opportunity to be
heard and to do justice,' and that plaintiff abuses its
opportunity through inexcusable neglect, the trial court does not
abuse its discretion in dismissing the case." Charlie Brown
Constr.. 740 P.2d at 1371 (citations omitted).
Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing Country Meadows' case against UDOH, that dismissal
"^operates as an adjudication upon the merits' of the case."
Maxfield v. Rushton. 779 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah App. 1989) (quoting
Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b)5). See also Charlie Brown Constr., 740
P.2d at 1371 (affirming the dismissal of an action "with
prejudice and on the merits"). Because dismissal of an action
under 41(b) "is dispositive of the case," Maxfield, 779 P.2d at
241, we need not consider the district court's decision on the
merits of UDOH's motion for summary judgment. See also Schonev
v. Memorial Estates, Inc.. 790 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App. 1990)
("Because the court's entry of default judgment is fully
supported . . . we need not address the issue of whether the
entry of summary judgment was also proper in this case.").
CONCLUSION
Because Country Meadows failed to provide any reasonable
justification for its failure to prosecute the case against UDOH
for over five years, we affirm the district court's dismissal of
that action based upon Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). The

5. The language in Rule 41(b) relevant to the effect of a
dismissal states, "Unless the court in its order for dismissal
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any
dismissal not provided for in this rule . . . operates as an
adjudication upon the merits."

920302-CA
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Michael L. Dowdle
Attorney for Defendant Pat B. Brian
915 West 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104
Telephone (801) 531-0060
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES A. JOHNSON and
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON,
)

JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL
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Civil No. 900400460CN

Plaintiffs,
j

V.

Judge VeNoy Christoffersen
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah
Corporation, Pat B. Brian,
Defendants.

)
]
]

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint pursuant
to Rule 41(b), U. R. Civ. P., came on for hearing before the
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen at 10:00 a.m. on Thursday, March
11, 1993. The hearing was conducted by telephone, pursuant to
stipulation of counsel for the respective parties and as
permitted by Rule 4-501(5), Code of Judicial Administration.
following appearances were entered:

The

Richard C. Coxson for

Plaintiffs; Arthur H. Nielsen, Larry L. Whyte and Marilynn P.
Fineshriber of Nielsen & Senior for Defendant Nielsen & Senior;
and Michael L. Dowdle for Defendant Pat B. Brian.

Chris L.

Schmutz did not appear in person or by counsel, the action having
previously been dismissed with prejudice as to him.
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings, motions, briefs
and other records and papers in this matter, having heard the
arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises,
made its oral ruling on the matter on March 11, 1993.

The Court,

having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, now
HEREBY ENTERS JUDGMENT that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs* Complaint pursuant to Rule 41(b), U. R. Civ. P. is
hereby granted and Plaintiffs' complaint and said action be, and
it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety with prejudice and on the
merits.
Costs are awarded to Defendants.
DATED this

?

day of

&/>7«t^

1993.

BY THE COURT:

- 2 19023 NI211 8500

Arthur H. Nielsen (2405)
Larry L. Whyte (4942)
Marilynn P. Fineshriber (4571)
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants Nielsen & Senior
1100 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 532-1900
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Michael L. Dowdle
Attorney for Defendant Pat B. Brian
915 West 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104
Telephone (801) 531-0060
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES A. JOHNSON and
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON,

)
)
)
|

Plaintiffs,
v.

;

NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah
Corporation, Pat B. Brian,
Defendants.

DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS
Civil No. 900400460CN

)
]

Judge VeNoy Christoffersen

;

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Pursuant to Rule 4-501, Code of Judicial Administration,
Defendants Nielsen & Senior and Pat B. Brian, by and through
their counsel of record, submit the following Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in reply to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE ARE FALSE AND
IRRELEVANT TO THE CLAIMS BEFORE THE COURT
Plaintiffs allege, in Point I of their responsive
memorandum, that Defendants have continued to harass and defame
Plaintiffs by contacting government agencies, a mortgagee,
Plaintiffs' neighbors and the defendants in the personal injury
suit brought by Plaintiffs.

Defendants deny each and every such

allegation, with a single exception:

Defendants openly contacted

counsel representing the defendants of Plaintiffs• personal
injury case to determine whether the emotional damages claimed by
Plaintiffs in that action overlapped the emotional damages
claimed by Plaintiffs in the instant case.

Plaintiffs are

obviously unable to document any of the remaining allegations, as
they have not made a single citation to the record in support of
their assertions.

While Defendants have engaged in appropriate

pre-trial discovery, Defendants deny that they have engaged in
any conduct which has been improper or which could be construed
to be harassment or defamation of Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs' unsupported allegations are, moreover,
irrelevant to the matters before this Court.

Only two causes of

action remain to be tried, framed as claims for breach of
contract and for malpractice and springing from the same core of
operative fact.

Point I of Plaintiffs' response, however,

contains the following language:

"As Plaintiffs attempt to nail

down all of the tortious conduct by Defendants, and resolve them

- 2 18566.NI211.8500

[sic] within this one action so that they can get on with their
lives . . . . "

It appears that Plaintiffs intend to assert

additional claims against Defendants, presumably, by amendment of
the Second Amended Complaint.
Defendants strenuously object to any proposal by Plaintiffs
to amend their Complaint to include additional causes of action.
Amendment to include such specious claims can only be for the
purpose of pressuring defendants to settle with plaintiffs.

It

would result in precisely the delay Defendant Brian anticipated
in his opposition to the Motion of Plaintiffs' counsel, Darwin
Fisher, to withdraw, and would create additional support for
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for failure to prosecute.

Any

effort by Plaintiffs to expand their claims clearly indicates
that Plaintiffs are not ready for trial.

See concurring opinion

of J. Orme, Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237, 241 (Utah App.
1989) .
POINT II
PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL HAS FAILED TO MAKE DILIGENT
EFFORT TO FAMILIARIZE HIMSELF WITH THE CASE
Plaintiffs* counsel filed his Notice of Appearance not on
December 22, 1992, as Plaintiffs alleged, but on October 26,
1992.

A copy of the Notice is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".

His appearance was acknowledged by the Court on
1992.

November 19,

A copy of the Memorandum Decision is attached hereto as

Exhibit "B".

Counsel has had nearly four months to become

familiar with the posture of this case.

Counsel should be aware

that the discovery cut-off date was May 1, 1992, and that this
- 3 18566.NI211.8500

Court clearly stated, in its Memorandum Decision dated May 20,
1992 and Order of June, 1992, that no exceptions would be
permitted.

Instead, on February 17, 1993, Plaintiffs submitted

to Defendants forty (40) requests for admissions, arguing that
they will be prepared for trial after responses to the requests
are received.
Defendants object to Plaintiffs' request for admissions and
move for a protective order and for sanctions against Plaintiffs
pursuant to Rules 26, 36, and 37, U. R. Civ. P.

The requests are

untimely, objectionable on the face, and the subject matter of
each has previously been addressed by Defendants.

For the

purposes of this Reply, counsel's lack of diligence and complete
lack of familiarity with the case is demonstrated by the filing
of the discovery requests.
Since his entering the case on October 26, 1992, counsel has
had ample time to ascertain the discovery cut-off date set by the
Court.

No discovery can be filed without obtaining leave of

Court, which this Court has, on prior occasions, refused to
grant.

Counsel's failure to request leave of court indicates a

lack of respect for the Court's orders or a total lack of
familiarity with the case.

There is no doubt that Plaintiffs'

counsel filed these Requests for Admissions as a subterfuge, to
cover up his failure to make a thorough review of the pleadings,
motions and orders on file.
As a result of counsel's lack of diligence and familiarity
with the case, Plaintiffs have filed motions without basis in
fact or law, served objectionable discovery demands, and made
- 4 18566.NI211.8500

further unsupported allegations against defendants.

Plaintiffs1

conduct supports Defendants' Motion.
POINT III
DISMISSAL IS APPROPRIATE PURSUANT TO RULE 4 1(b),
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Without repeating the arguments of the Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Defendants* Motion to Dismiss,
Defendants point out that Plaintiffs' submission of discovery
requests at this point in the case increases the factual
similarity between the present case and Maxfield v. Rushton, 779
P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1989).

In Maxfield, the plaintiff filed a

Complaint and then amended it twice, each adding new theories of
the case.

Plaintiff moved for summary judgment three times and

filed an interlocutory appeal for the trial court's refusal to
grant it.

The appeal was denied by the Supreme Court.

Plaintiffs' attorneys withdrew from representation.
objected to all three of the trial dates set.

Two of

P]aintiff

When Plaintiff

moved to amend the Complaint a third time and, at the same time,
his third attorney moved to withdraw, the trial court dismissed
the action for failure to prosecute the action in a timely
manner.

Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d at 239.

The dismissal was

affirmed on appeal.
The present case is factually indistinguishable from
Maxfield.

Plaintiffs' submission of extensive discovery requests

at this late hour coupled with the suggestion that a motion for
leave to amend the Complaint yet again to "nail down all of the
tortious conduct by defendants, and resolve them [sic] within
- 5 18566.NI211.8500

this one action" is impending, places Plaintiffs squarely within
the ambit of Maxfield.

Because Plaintiffs' failure to proceed

with diligence is inexcusable not only from the parties'
standpoint, but also because it constitutes abuse of the judicial
process, dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b) is appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Resolution of this matter is long overdue.

For the reasons

set forth above and in Defendants' prior Memorandum, Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint for failure to prosecute
should be granted.
REQUEST FOR HEARING
Defendants request an opportunity to present oral argument
at a time convenient to the Court and counsel.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of February, 1993.
NIELSEN & SENIOR

Arthur H. Niels
Larry L. Whyte
Marilynn P. Fineshriber
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen &
Senior

:hael L. Dowdlc
Dowdle
Michael
Attorney for Defendant Pat B. Brian
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RICHARD C. COXSON (A5933)
Attorney for Plaintiffs
275 North Main
Spanish Fotk, UT 84660
(801) 798-3574
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JAMES A. JOHNSON and JENNTFER
I, . JOHNSON, (Probate No. PR-86-502,
Fourth District),

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiffs,
v<
NIELSEN & SENTOR, a Utah
Corporation, PAT B. BRIAN, and
CHRIS L. SCHMUTZ,

Civil No. 90040460 CN

Defendants.
BACKGROUND
Present counsel has only recently begun representation in this
matter. Prior counsel had to withdraw due to a conflict of interest
which he determined existed between the interests of plaintiffs in
other matters pending
represents.

Because

in his office and other clients whom he

of

the

complexity

of

this

case, and

the

continued malicious acts of defendants, plaintiffs are entitled to
further time to prepare for trial.
FACTS
1.

Present counsel entered Notice of Appearance on December

22, 1992.
2.

Prior counsel withdrew representation due to a conflict

of interest between plaintiffs and other matters pending in prior

counsel f s office.
3.

Defendants are continuing to interfere with plaintiffs 1

business interests and are continuing to defame plaintiffs.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
There Has Been No Inaction In This Case
Defendants 1

Memorandum

in Support

of Motion

to Dismiss

is

based upon an argument of inaction by plaintiffs. The problem with
this argument is that they know that the argument is fallacious and
is

made

in

bad

faith.

Plaintiffs

are

continuing

to

receive

harassment by defendants in the following forms: (1) The F.B.I, has
been contacted by defendants regarding past business associations
of the plaintiffs with other individuals; (2) The Small
Administration

has

been

contacted

by

defendants;

Business

(3) The

Utah

Department of Securities has been contacted by defendants regarding
plaintiffs;

(4) Ecclesiastical

leaders

of plaintiffs

have

been

contacted by defendants to pressure them into dropping this action;
(5) Mortgage lenders and trustee holders of plaintiffs' home have
been contacted to foreclosure on plaintiffs; (6) Opposing parties
in personal injury actions have been contacted by defendants; and
(6) Defendants have defamed plaintiffs to their neighbors and other
associates .
The

above well

documented

actions

are malicious

and

are a

direct outgrowth of this action. As plaintiffs attempt to nail down
all of the tortious conduct by defendants, and resolve them within

2
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Plaintiff's Seconded

(SIC) Complaint, the facts are definitely

disputed.

are

The

facts

not

as

set

out

and

do not

support

defendants.
With regard to the first factor, defendants have undertaken to
destroy plaintiffs' lives by attacking them both with the judicial
system, the police, their business associates, their ecclesiastical
relations, and their neighbors. Plaintiffs have tried to mitigate
this damage as well as document what defendants have been doing,
and

involuntary

dismissal

would

be

to

reward

this

egregious

conduct.
Second, the opportunity to move the case forward. Both pnilies
have had the opportunity to move the case forward, and both parties
have moved the case forward during the last two and a half (2 1/2)
years. Defendants have not shovm candor by their statements to the
contrary, and, unfortunately, taken in light of their inability to
understand simple adoption laws, is to be expected.
Third, each party has moved the case forward. It is undisputed
that both parties have conducted discovery, and that defendants are
now ready for trial. However, defendants' readiness for trial does
not

indicate

that

plaintiffs

are

not

entitled

to

complete

preparations of their case. Plaintiffs will shortly be prepared for
trial after response to discovery which has just been sent out.
Fourth, the difficulty or prejudice that may have been caused
to the other side. Plaintiffs appreciate that the defendants have
been greatly aggravated by being involved in this law suit and that

4

1ft

this

one

action

so

that

they

can

get

on

with

their

lives,

defendants blithely are claiming that they are without fault and
that the progress of this action is entirely due to plaintiffs.
Defendants, however, are acting with "unclean hands" which acts are
intended to be harassing, and are certainly the type Rule 11 was
meant to deal with. Plaintiffs are not intent on Rule 11 sanctions,
but simply that they be allowed to resolve the issues in this case.
Plaintiffs are moving

as quickly

as possible to resolve

these

issues, and have submitted their last discovery to defendants in
order to be prepared for trial.
POINT 11
Dismissal Is An Abusive Discretion
Westinghouse

Electric

Supply

Company

v.

Paul

W.

Larsen

Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) is the precedential case
with regard to involuntary dismissal for failure to prosecute. The
factors discussed in Westinghouse were set out in detail in Meadow
Fresh Farms v. Utah State University, 813 P. 2d 1216 (Utah App.
1991), which five factors are: first, the conduct of the parties;
second, the

opportunity

each

party

has had

to move

the

case

forward; third, what each party has done to move the case forward;
fourth, the amount of difficulty or prejudice that may have been
caused

to the

other side; and

fifth, most

important, whether

injustice may result from the dismissal.
Contrary to defendants1 arguments in the Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

3

it has been difficult to complete some aspects of the discovery.
However, plaintiffs have also been aggravated

in that

defendants

have continually sought protective orders and refused to provide
relevant

discovery

so

that

plaintiffs'

case

might

go

forward.

Plaintiffs believe that both sides are about even on this issue.
Fifth, injustice from dismissal, this would clearly

fall in

favor of plaintiffs in as much as they have been aggrieved by the
incompetent

representation

of

defendants

which

consequentially

resulted in the destruction of their health, their business, and
other

relationships.

litigating

the

The

issues

courts
is

much

have
more

consistently
important

ruled
than

that
simple

administrative clean up when things are slow.
* n Westinghouse, the court held that:
It is our conclusion that the trial court failed to give
proper weight to the priority; and that under the
circumstances described herein, the order of dismissal
was an abusive discretion. It is therefore necessary that
they were to be vacated and the case remain remanded
forth for further proceedings. Westinqhouse, 544 P. 2d at
879.
Plaintiffs have nearly*prepared their case for trial, and once
discovery is completed are willing to proceed. In as much as there
as been a continual movement

forward for trial during the entire

period,

not

and

defendants

have

been

prejudiced,

dismissal

is

improper.

5
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CONCLUSION
Dismissal

is

improper

except

circumstances. Defendants have failed
circumstances

are

egregious,

and

the

in

the

most

egregious

to show that the present
facts

are

in

dispute.

Dismissal of this action is therefore improper and of abuse and
discretion.

DATED this L/jday

of

/ ~ {° J^^U^T^yf

, 1993.

RICHAR&^C. COXSON
Attorney for Plaintiffs
275 North Main
Spanish Fork, UT 84660
(801) 798-3574
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Michael L. Dowdle, Esq. (4025)
Attorney for Defendant Pat B. Brian
915 West 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104
Telephone (801) 531-0060
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES A. JOHNSON and
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON,

JOINDER OF DEFENDANT PAT B.
BRIAN IN MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT
AND CONDITIONAL MOTION
TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM

Plaintiffs,

vs.
NIELSEN 8c SENIOR, a Utah
Corporation, and Pat B. Brian,

Civil No. 900400460CN
Judge VeNoy Christofferson

Defendants,
Defendant Pat B. Brian, by and through counsel, hereby joins
in the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint filed by Defendant
Nielsen & Senior, and the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint.
Defendant Pat B. Brian further conditionally moves this Court, if
and in the event that Plaintiffs' Complaint is dismissed, to
dismiss the Counterclaim of Defendant Pat B. Brian in order to
provide a final adjudication of all issues pending in this matter,
conditioned that if Plaintiffs' Complaint is ever restored or
reinstated, for any reason whatsoever, Defendant's Counterclaim
shall automatically be restored and reinstated.
DATED this

r - dav^ of February, 1993.

/tksStittUt
Michael L. Dowdle
Attorney for Defendant Pat B. Brian

Arthur H, Nielsen (2405)
Larry L. Whyte (4942)
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants Nielsen & Senior
1100 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 532-1900

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES A. JOHNSON and
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON,
Plaintiffs,
v•
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah
Corporation, Pat B. Brian,
Defendants.

)
)
)

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISMISS PLAINTIFFS'
COMPLAINT

i

Civil No. 900400460CN

])

Judge VeNoy Christofferson

]

Pursuant to Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
through its counsel of record, Arthur H. Nielsen and Larry L.
Whyte, Defendant Nielsen & Senior moves the Court to dismiss with
prejudice and on the merits Plaintiffs' Complaint for failure to
prosecute their claim with diligence.

This Motion is supported

by the Memorandum of Points and Authorities filed herewith.

- 9
DATED this ^ ^ ^ d a y of February, 1993.
NIELSEN & SENIOR

Arthur H. Nielsen
Larry L. Whyte
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen & Senior

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ^*J\ day of February, 1993, I
have caused to be sent, through the United States mails, firstclass postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT addressed as follows:
Richard C, Coxson, A5933
Attorney for Plaintiffs
275 North Main
Spanish Fork, UT 84660
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Arthur H. Nielsen (2405)
Larry L. Whyte (4942)
Marilynn P. Fineshriber (4571)
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen & Senior
1100 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 532-1900
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES A. JOHNSON and
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON,

;
]i
i
1
1
;1

Plaintiffs,
v.
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah
Corporation, Pat B. Brian,

;i
;
i

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S SECONDED
AMENDED COMPLAINT
Civil No. 900400460CN
Judge VeNoy Christofferson

Defendants.
Defendant Nielsen & Senior submits the following Memorandum
in Support of its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended
Complaint with prejudice and on the merits.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendants submit the following facts which are established
by the record of this matter:
1.

In November, 1987, Plaintiffs, through their counsel,

Mark F. Robinson, contacted Defendants to assert claims for
several thousand dollars allegedly spent by Plaintiffs to
finalize the adoption at issue in this case.

Shortly thereafter,

Mr. Robinson discontinued his representation of Plaintiffs.

2.

In August, 1988, D. David Lambert of Howard, Lewis and

Petersen, made contact with Defendants to assert Plaintiffs1
claims regarding the adoption. At this time, Plaintiffs were
demanding payment of $47,000.00. Defendants met with Mr. Lambert
to discuss the possible resolution of Plaintiffs' claims. On
February 17, 1989, Mr. Lambert's representation of Plaintiffs was
terminated by Plaintiffs.
3.

In 1989, Plaintiffs contacted officials of the Church

of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints to bring pressure to bear
upon Defendant Brian to capitulate to Plaintiffs' demands.
Meetings were held between Plaintiffs, Defendant Brian, and
Church officials. During this period, Plaintiffs alternated
claiming that they were representing themselves or that they had
retained counsel. At this time, Plaintiffs set their claims at
an amount in excess of $87,000.00.
4.

Plaintiffs' original complaint in this matter was

filed, pro se, on June 22, 1990.

It contained claims for

negligence, violation of child placement laws, breach of
covenants of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentation,
intentional infliction and negligent infliction of emotional
distress and breach of contract, and sought damages of an
undisclosed amount.

On or about July 2, 1990, Plaintiffs filed

their first Amended Complaint, which contained the same claims
for relief.
- 2 17969.NI211.8500

5.

During the spring and summer of 1990, Plaintiffs

claimed to be searching for legal counsel to represent them
against Defendants.

Plaintiffs publicized the matter by

contacting scores of lawyers and law firms, sending out packets
of information which contained, among other things, their claims
against Defendant Brian then pending before the Utah State Bar.
6.

On or about July 13, 1990, Defendants received a letter

from D. Lanny Waite, a Las Vegas, Nevada, attorney who claimed to
represent Plaintiffs in this matter. Mr. Waite1s letter proposed
settlement of the claims for $180,000.00, and expressed his
anticipation that the media attention already given to the case
would increase due to Judge Brian's position.

Plaintiffs later

denied that Mr. Waite represented them.
7.

Defendants answered the First Amended Complaint and on

or about July 30, 1990, Defendant Nielsen & Senior noticed the
Plaintiffs' depositions, to commence on August 17, 1990. On
August 16, 1990, the day before the scheduled depositions, Jerold
D. Conder and Peter L. Rognlie of the law firm of Conder &
Wangsgard entered their appearance as counsel for Plaintiffs, and
the scheduled depositions were postponed until they could become
familiar with the case.
8.

On or about September 12, 1990, Conder & Wangsgard

filed Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, alleging professional

- 3 17969.NI211.8500

malpractice, breach of contract, negligence and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and negligent
misrepresentation.
9.

The deposition of Plaintiff James Johnson finally began

on November 28, 1990, more than three months after it was
originally scheduled.

The deposition lasted for three (3) days,

until November 30, 1990, at which time a rift developed between
Plaintiffs and their counsel over the course of the discovery and
the case in general. The deposition was adjourned by Plaintiffs'
counsel, indicating that Mr. Johnson was ill.
10.

On or about January 16, 1991, Conder & Wangsgard

withdrew as counsel for Plaintiffs, and Defendant Nielsen &
Senior sent out a notice to appoint counsel or to appear in
person on January 18, 1991.
11.

On March 21, 1991, David R. Irvine wrote to Defendant

Nielsen & Senior, indicating that he anticipated entering his
appearance as counsel of record for Plaintiffs, and inquiring
regarding a resolution of this matter by settlement.
Notwithstanding the letter and preliminary discussions, Mr.
Irvine did not enter an appearance for Plaintiffs as counsel in
the case.
12.

A scheduling conference was scheduled by the Court on
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April 16, 1991. The conference was continued when Darwin C.
Fisher of Nielsen, Hill & Fisher entered an appearance on behalf
of Plaintiffs on April 15, 1991.
13.

A new scheduling and settlement conference was

scheduled by the Court on June 26, 1991, in Logan, Utah.

This

conference was held, however, on July 12, 1991, and Plaintiffs'
counsel demurred on all discussions of a resolution of the case
due to his need to familiarize himself with the case. A
scheduling order was entered by this Court on August 13, 1991,
setting discovery and motion cutoff, expert witness designation
and pretrial conference dates, and a trial date of February 3-10,
1992.
14.

Notwithstanding Defendants * numerous attempts to

complete Plaintiffs' depositions, continuation of the deposition
of Plaintiff James Johnson was delayed until October 10, 1991.
The reasons given for the delay were that Mr. Fisher was unable
to become sufficiently familiar with facts of the case before the
deposition.

The deposition examination was finally concluded on

October 11, 1991, almost a year after it was begun.
15.

A hearing was held in St. George, Utah on December

6,

1991, regarding Defendants* motions to dismiss, or in the
alternative for summary judgment as to various of the causes of
action in Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint.

At the hearing,

also, the parties discussed resolution of the case. Mr. Fisher
- 5 17969.NI211.8500

requested delay of the trial set for February 3-10, 1992, until
later that month. Various scheduling dates were again set.
16.

Pursuant to this Court's Order of January, 1992,

Defendant Pat B. Brian was granted leave to file a Counterclaim.
Upon motion of Plaintiffs' counsel, the trial date of February
18-28, 1992, was stricken and the trial set for May 5 through 14,
1992.
17.

In February, 1992, this Court heard Defendants' motions

to dispose of certain causes of action in Plaintiffs' Second
Amended Complaint.

Subsequent to this hearing, in April, 1992,

counsel for Plaintiffs entreated the Court to strike the trial
date set for May on the basis that discovery was still necessary
to complete preparations for trial, that counsel could not be
ready for the trial in so short a time, and that certain
conflicts existed which necessitated that the date be re-set.
Although opposed by Defendants, the motion to strike the trial
date was granted by the Court. A new trial date was set for
November 2-13, 1992, and the discovery cut-off date was extended
through May, 1992.
18.

In April, 1992, counsel for Plaintiffs filed with the

Utah Supreme Court a petition for permission to appeal an
interlocutory order of the trial Court with regard to its rulings
dismissing certain causes of action in Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint.

On April 7, 1992, this Court entered an order
- 6 -
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striking the scheduling order, and continuing the trial, without
date.

The Utah Supreme Court denied the Plaintiffs' petition on

May 21, 1992.
19.

During discovery proceedings, Plaintiff gave notice of

taking the deposition of Lizanne Magleby.
Ms. Magleby did not appear.
deposition.

On the date scheduled,

Counsel agreed to reschedule the

Thereafter, Plaintiffs cancelled Ms. Magleby's

deposition.
20.

Thereafter, Defendants noticed the taking of the

deposition of Ms. Magleby, whereupon Plaintiffs refused to
cooperate in making Ms. Magleby available for the deposition.
Defendants were required to obtain leave of the Court to depose
Ms. Magleby after the discovery cut-off, notwithstanding that it
was Plaintiff's dilatory conduct which delayed the scheduling of
the deposition.

The deposition was set for June 30, 1990.

Plaintiffs moved, again, to delay on the grounds that their
counsel would be unable to attend.

The matter was argued to the

court on June 25, 1992, and an Order entered that the deposition
proceed as scheduled.
21.

Plaintiffs have taken no action to move this case

forward since Plaintiffs took the deposition of Brent Hoggan in
February, 1992, approximately one year ago.
22.

The deposition of Ms. Magleby, by Defendants, was the

last action on the case.
- 7 17969.NI211.8500

23.

On or about October 5, 1992, Darwin C. Fisher moved for

a leave to withdraw as Plaintifffs counsel.

Defendant Brian

opposed the Motion, arguing that further delay, prejudicial to
Defendants, would ensue. Mr. Fisher's Motion was granted and the
appearance of Richard Coxson as counsel for Plaintiffs was
acknowledged by the Court on November 19, 1992.
24.

Defendants have not asked for a continuance at any time

during these protracted proceedings and have consistently
represented to the Court their readiness for trial.
ARGUMENT
I
PLAINTIFFS1 DILATORY CONDUCT WARRANTS
DISMISSAL OF THEIR CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS
Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, empowers this
Court to dismiss an action, with prejudice and on the merits, for
failure of the Plaintiff to prosecute.

"The burden is upon the

Plaintiff to prosecute a case in due course without unusual or
unreasonable delay."

Charlie Brown Construction Co., Inc. v.

Leisure Sports Incorporated, 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah App. 1987)
(quoting Lake Meredith Reservoir Co. v. Amity Mutual Irrigation
Co., 698 P.2d 1340, 1344 (Colo. 1985)).

Plaintiffs must

"prosecute their claims with due diligence, or accept the penalty
of dismissal." Id., (quoting Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323,
1325 (Utah 1975)).

Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a

decision within the broad discretion of the trial court.
- 8 17969.NI211.8500

Id.

The Court of Appeals has held that it will not interfere with the
trial court's decision unless it clearly appears that the Court
has abused its discretion and that there is a likelihood that
injustice resulted.

Id.

The Utah Supreme Court provided the trial courts with
guidance on Rule 41(b) dismissals in Westinghouse Electrical
Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879
(Utah 1975).

In that case, the Court reviewed a Rule 41(b)

dismissal for failure to prosecute and identified the factors to
be considered in determining whether such a dismissal is
appropriate.

Those factors were articulated recently by the

Court of Appeals as follows:
The Westinghouse court delineated five factors in
addition to the length of time elapsed to determine the
propriety of a dismissal for failure to prosecute: (1)
the conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity each
party has had to move the case forward; (3) what each
party has done to move the case forward; (4) the amount
of difficulty or prejudice that may have been caused to
the other side; and (5) "most important, whether
injustice may result from the dismissal."
Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State University, 813 P.2d 1216, 1219
(Utah App. 1991).

The following facts of Plaintiffs' conduct are

undisputed and establish that dismissal is proper, pursuant to
Westinghouse.

- 9 17969.NI211.8500

A.

Plaintiffs' conduct has repeatedly delayed the movement of
this matter to trial while Defendants have consistently
moved the case forward.
As the facts of this Memorandum illustrate, Plaintiffs have

failed to move the case forward.

Plaintiffs have been

represented by numerous attorneys in this matter, the withdrawal
of each resulting in delay.

Plaintiffs have amended their

Complaint twice, and have, three times, requested a continuance
of a trial setting.

Plaintiff James Johnson's deposition was

rescheduled several times and finally completed more than a year
after noticed.

In April, 1992, Plaintiffs filed with the Utah

Supreme Court a petition for interlocutory appeal, which required
that the fourth trial setting for November, 1992, be stricken.
Although the petition was denied and Plaintiffs were free to
proceed with their case, Plaintiffs have taken no action at all
since February, 1992.
Even this abbreviated listing of facts demonstrates the
Plaintiffs• lack of determination to move the case forward to
trial.

Defendants, however, have proceeded with the case,

pursuing discovery, narrowing the issues for trial by Motion, and
consistently representing to the Court their readiness for trial.
Defendants have moved the case forward whenever there has been
'opportunity to do so.

- 10 17969.NI211.8500

B.

Plaintiffs' failure to prosecute the case with diligence
caused difficulty and prejudice to Defendants.
Plaintiffs' numerous changes of counsel, amendments to

pleadings, reluctant compliance with Defendants' discovery
requests and inability to go forward with trial when set have
greatly increased Defendants' burden of defending this action•
Defendants have been deprived of the benefits of a prompt
resolution of the claims against them.

Delay has made the

presentation of evidence at trial more difficult, prejudicing
Defendants, whose defenses require the accurate testimony of
third parties who may become unavailable with the passage of
time.

Further, delay has unnecessarily increased the cost of

defense.
Defendants have lived more than five and one-half years with
the Plaintiffs' threats and harrassment.

Defendants have

prepared to respond to Plaintiffs' claims on the merits but
Plaintiffs have stalled every effort to place the matter before
the Court.
C.

Dismissal will not result in injustice to Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs must diligently prosecute their claims or accept

the penalty of dismissal.

Charlie Brown Construction Co., Inc.

v. Leisure Sports Incorporated, 740 P.2d at 1370. Such dismissal
is not unjust when it is Plaintiffs' conduct alone that invites
dismissal or could have avoided it. The Plaintiffs in this case
have shown no determination to get their claims resolved on the
- 11 17969.NI211.8500

merits.

Presumably, they are aware of the consequences of their

lack of diligence.
Defendants acknowledge that this Court must "balance the
need to expedite litigation and efficiently utilize judicial
resources with the need to allow parties to have their day in
court."

Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State University, 813 P.2d

1216, 1219 (Utah App. 1991).

Notwithstanding, when the facts of

this matter are evaluated against the factors set forth in
Westinghouse, dismissal is, clearly, just.
II
DISMISSAL OF THIS CASE WOULD BE CONSISTENT
WITH PRIOR DECISIONS OF UTAH COURTS
In Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1989), the
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's dismissal of Maxfield1s
Complaint for lack of prosecution.

The facts considered by the

Court were these: The plaintiff filed his Complaint in 1980 and
amended it twice, each time adding new theories of the case.
at 239.

Id.

Plaintiff moved for summary judgment three times and

filed an interlocutory appeal for the trial Court's refusal to
grant it. The appeal was denied by the Supreme Court.
plaintiff's attorneys withdrew from representation.

Two of

Plaintiffs

objected to all three of the trial dates set. When plaintiff
moved to amend the Complaint a third time and, at the same time,
his third attorney moved to withdraw, the trial court dismissed

- 12 17969.NI211.8500

the action for failure to prosecute the action in a timely
manner.

Id.

The Court of Appeals reviewed the facts in light of the
Westinghouse factors, stating that "there is more to consider in
determining if a dismissal for failure to prosecute is proper
than merely the amount of time elapsed since the suit was filed."
Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d at 237 (quoting Westinghouse
Electrical Supply Co., 544 P.2d at 879).

With regard to the

issue of injustice, the court held:
[W]hile we recognize that injustice could result
from dismissal of this case, in that Maxfield will lose
whatever interest he may have in the disputed property
without having the opportunity to argue his case on its
merits, we conclude that he had more than ample
opportunity to prove his asserted interest and simply
failed to do so. Such nonaction is inexcusable, not
only from the standpoint of the parties, but also
because it constitutes abuse of the judicial process.
Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d at 240-241.

It is apparent that

the court did not equate the activity in the case with timely
prosecution.
The special concurrence of Judge Orme is particularly
pertinent to the case at hand.

The concurring opinion identified

the following conduct of plaintiff as determinative:
Maxfield1s latest counsel's motion for leave to
withdraw coupled with his motion for leave to file yet
another amended complaint constituted, taken together,
a concession by Maxfield that he was nowhere near being
ready to try his case in the matter for a few days even
though the action had been pending for the better part
of a decade. It is the length of time this action had
been pending, coupled with Maxfield's obvious
- 13 17969.N1211.8500

unreadiness that makes sua sponte dismissal appropriate
in this case.
Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d at 241.
Plaintiffs began a course of threats and harrassment toward
Defendants nearly five and one-half years ago.

Defendants

received demands for payment, by Plaintiffs or by counsel on
their behalf, for nearly three years before the original
Complaint was filed.

The action has been pending for two and

one-half years, during which time Defendants have diligently
prepared for trial. Plaintiffs have not prepared for trial, but
have pressed Defendants with their demands for ever increasing
amounts of damages. Defendants are entitled to an end to
threats, by resolution of this matter.
This Court is, also, entitled to relief. As in Maxfield,
Plaintiffs• nonaction is inexcusable not only from Defendants•
standpoint, but because it constitutes abuse of the judicial
process.

Dismissal, therefore, would be consistent with the

precedents of the Utah Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
The Westinghouse factors remain the standard governing
dismissal, whether the trial court dismisses, sua sponte. an
action for failure to prosecute, pursuant to Rule 4-103, or upon
motion, pursuant to Rule 41(b).

Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State

University. 813 P.2d 1216 1219 (Utah App. 1991).

As Defendants

have demonstrated above, an excimination of the facts of this case
in light of those factors supports dismissal of this action with
- 14 17969.N1211.8500

prejudice and on the merits.

It is within this Court's

discretion to grant Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss.
CONCLUSION
Resolution of this matter is long overdue.

For the reasons

set forth above, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs'
Complaint for failure to prosecute should be granted.
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of February, 1993.
NIELSEN & SENIOR

By vtfA/u4jn>^
Arthnr H. Nielsen
Larry L. Whyte
Marilynn P. Fineshriber
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen &
Senior
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of February, 1993, I
have caused to be sent, through the United States mails, firstclass postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S SECONDED AMENDED COMPLAINT
addressed as follows:
Richard C. Coxson, A5933
Attorney for Plaintiffs
275 North Main
Spanish Fork, UT 84660

TfWuJl/^^
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Darwin C. Fisher, Bar No. 1080
Attorney for Plaintiff
Jamestown Square, Suite 200
3319 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-6600
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES A. JOHNSON and
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON,

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT PAT B. BRIAN'S MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
NIELSON & SENIOR, a Utah
Corporation, PAT B. BRIAN,
and CHRIS L. SCHMUTZ,

Civil No. 900400460CN
Judge VeNoy Christofferson

Defendants.
Plaintiffs, James A. Johnson and Jennifer L. Johnson by and
through their attorney of record, Darwin C. Fisher, and hereby
submit the following Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Pat B.
Brian's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

DISPUTED FACTS
1.

In approximately August or September of 1989, Pat B.

Brian contacted Mark J. Howard, Stake President of James Johnson
who was serving as a bishop in a BYU ward under the authority and
direction of Mr. Howard.

Pat Brian also contacted Richard Stowe,

the Plaintiffs Stake President in the Plaintiffs home ward of the

same church.
without

the

Defendant contacted Mark Howard and Richard Stowe
consent

or

knowledge

of

the

Plaintiffs.

See

Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Tacts No. 6.
2.

In the meeting with Mark Howard, Defendant Pat Brian told

Mark Howard that the Johnson's were not telling the truth and
witnesses would be brought forth to prove that the Plaintiffs were
not telling the truth, that the Plaintiffs have been involved in
several law suits thus Defendant was implying that the Johnsons
have brought this suit against Pat Brian only to gain money from
Defendant Pat Brian through legal process to which they were not
entitled and had done this not only to Pat Brian but to others.
3.

Defendant

Pat Brian, or an individual

on behalf

of

Defendant Pat Brian contacted Alden Porter, a member of the Second
Quorum of the Seventies in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints.
Howard

As a result of the contact, Alden Porter contacted Mark
concerning

the

discussions

Mark

Howard

had

with

the

Johnsons.
4.

As a result of the conversations between Mark Howard and

Defendant Pat Brian and others on behalf of Pat Brian, Mark Howard
informed the Johnsons that it was his opinion that they should
settle the matter for the amount of $30,000.00.
5.

Mark Howard was contacted by Arthur Nielsen, a principle

in the firm of Nielsen & Senior and told that Pat Brian had indeed
made a mistake, but it was a small mistake.

1241

6.

Alden Porterf a • .

or a representative

-; .

t

of Pat Brian contacted James Johnson and

requested from him information regarding tin- law r^ilt

between the

Plaintiffs and Defendant Pat Brian and encou ,.,.*•

*

settle.
7.

Defendant Pat Brian was fully aware of the bonding * .-,«;.

was taking place between the Plaintiffs
frequent contact w1lit Plaintiff James Johnson

1
^

-

> awaie

of the bonding that took place in the Plaintiffs family with the
minor child.
0

Defendant Pat Brian informed the Plaintiffs that there

were no problems with the adoption and the Plaintiffs need only to
wait the period of six months for the ad .

.

filed, when in fact, the Defendant Pat Brian had done nothing to
secure the consent of the natural mother nor

finalize the

adoption proceedings leaving the Plaintifi
minor child could be taken from their presence at any time

jJ the

natural mo t h e r.
9

The Plaintiffs have suffered seyoit* <»inol 11 nil Il I i <i iiin.i.

I0

Defendant Pat Brian personally or through representatives

contacted representatives of the FBI and SBA in order to Influence
the Plaintiffs to diminish lln-ii nait.
Plaintiffs did not write to or speak with Stuart GJ azi er

3

outrageous.

T h e Sanuns' holding has been reaffirmed

in White v

B l a c k b u r n , 787 P.2d 1315 (Utah A p p . 1 9 9 0 ) , In R e Estate of Grimm,
7 04 I • 2( 1 J 2 31) (• I• :. ;• J. I \ j: »}r

J 9£ 9 )

• j u 1 Beiser v Lohner.

J

(Utah 1982).

POINT II
THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO WHETHER
DEFENDANT INTENTIONALLY INFLICTED EMOTIONAL STRESS UPON THE
PLAINTIFFS.

DISCUSSION
In

order

to

support

a

Cause

of

Action

for

intentional

infliction of emotional distress, the Plaintiff must i !.-:
Outrageous conduct by the Defendant;
2.

T h e Defendant's intent to c a u s e , or the reckless
disregard of the probability of causing, emotional
distress;

3.

Severe emotional d i s t r e s s ;

4.

A n actual or proximate causal link between the tortuous
conduct and the emotional d i s t r e s s . White v B l a c k b u r n ,
supra.

Plaintiff
perpetuated

by

must

show

t h e offensive

\lie Defendant

with

behavior

the purpose

emotional distress or where any reasonable perecim w

" ve been
inflicting
»/>• IN.-WII

that such would result and Defendants' actions aie of sue!I a ilature
as t o b e considered

ul iiKj<M,nis and intolerable in that they offend

6

1£37

-"

several

occasions

regarding

Defendant

Spring, Summer and Fall of 1989.
I In in I i s | n i l I ill I a t i „

12.
Stuart

Hi „

Pat

Brian during

See Defendants' Statement

of

/

Plaintiffs did not repeatedly insist during

Glazier

the

arrange

and

participate

in

a

1989 that

meeting

Plaintiffs and Defendant

r»nt In i tin i eqai cl i ni| i.

Plaintiffs against him.

See Defendant's Statement

between

•

y tae

:t Undisputed

Facts N o . 3.
leaten to file a Il i , t \ EII i :i t aga:i nst'

Plaintiffs did
Defendant

Brian

if

he

did

not

pay

a

large

Plaintiffs in the meeting with Stuart Glazier.
Statement of Undisputed Facts lie
J),

sum

of

See

money

to

Defendant's

5.

Plaintiffs, during the meeting with Stuart Glazier, did

not confirm for Defendant Brian the business address of Richard
Stowe in Draper, Utah, and suggest the he meet wi th and cli sciiu i I In;
Plaintiffs

allegations

with

Richard

Stowe.

See

Defendant's

Statement of 1 11 td i s p t 11< 2c I Facts No. 7 .
15.

Mr

Mark Howard was requested by Defendant

the Plaintiffs to settle this matter.

M

In

IMH»

'in.iyu

See Defendant's Statement of;

Undisputed Facts No. 10, 19 and 2 0 ,

ISSUE I
IS DEFENDANT PAT BRIAN ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION FOR THE INTENTIONAL INFLICTION

4

ON
OF

EMOTIONAL DISTRESS?
LAW
A Motion for Suinmaiy Judgment should be denied when* 1 ho
evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact. Young v
Felornia, 212 Utah 646, 244 P.2d 862, Cert, den., 344 U.S.
886, 73 S.Ct. 186, 97 L.Ed. 685, (1952); Ruffinenao v Miller,
579 P.2d 342 (Utah 1978) .

POINT I
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ll Hin)GMlXkD AS
A TORT IN THE STATE OF UTAH.
DISCUSSION
The

State

of

Utah

allows

recovery

for

«»

mlnnl mual

infliction of emotional distress without a showing of physical
injury.
"The best considered view recognizes an action for severe
emotional distress though not accompanied by bodily
impact or physical impact or physical injury, where
Defendant intentionally engaged in some conduct toward
the Plaintiff, (a) with the purpose of inflicting
emotional distress, or, (b) any reasonable person would
have known that such would result; and his actions are of
such a nature as to be considered outrageous and
intolerable in that they offend against the generally
accepted standaids of decency and morality."
Samms v
Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344, 346-47 (1961); See
also White v Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315 (Utah App. 1990);
In Re Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d 173R (Utah App. 1989).
The Samms' holding corresponds with Section 46(3)
Restatement

of Torts

determining

whether

?d and
the

Defendants
5

I I he

lion provides

;•. I "MI

actions

.J f ficiently

w«

for

against

generally

accepted

standard?; ml

f.

di-Mienr

Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed <*. bounds
of

that

usually

toleratecI in a civilized

community.

White

v

Blackburn, supra.

I\
The

element

characteristic
Whether

01 JTRAGEOUS CONDUCT BY DEFENDANT
of

outrageous

conduct

is

of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Defendant ;» conduct

was

sufficiently

outrageous

io

a

principle focus of the Court's inquiry in delei m i n i itq whether a
valid cause of action exists.
Defendants outrageous conduct may arise in different ways 1ml.,
the

acts

standards

complained

of must

offend

of decency and morality.

against

ed

Mere insults, indignities,

threats, annoyances, petty oppression

trivialities are

sufficient to support a cause of action.
S ec t J

aei

Restatemen

V*

c omme n t u \ i i? u ^ j .

Outrageous conduct has been found where the circumstances of
the case are unusually aggravated

In Samms v Eccles, siipra, the

Court found that Defendant's offensive solicitations to engage in
sex over a period of i

and where the Defendant also indecently

exposed himself to the Plaintiff was conduc I i.lni.ltjcd as extreme
n»

. uable.

In addition, an abuse of a position of leail

•

7

1231

apparent power or authority over the Plaintiff is frequent
to be outrageously offensive.

Thus, the California Supreme Court

held an insurance company liable for . I ,, iofus.iL to settle the
claim within the policy limit where a subsequent jury award against
the insured rendered the insured indigent.
Exch. , 7 Cal.3d 61 6, -nil I
„

Also,

rubbish

collectors

Unruh v Truck Ins.

,1 1111,1, It)? ral.Hpti. uxl
association, was

held

(1972).

"M.., ie

im

intentional infliction of mental distress when it threatened to
beat up the Plaintiff and put him out of bu.Minp&H unless he paid a
substantial sum to the association for its receipt of an account
from

one

of

its

member.

State

Rubbish

Collectors

Assn.

v

Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952).
There is a genuine issues of material fact as to whether or
not there has been outrageous C O L
Brian.

y the Defendant Pat !)•

Those issues are:

1.

Whether Defendant Pat Brian failed to obtain the written
consent of the natural mother because he did not realize
that the written consent that he had obtained from the
natural mother prior to the birth of the child was not
sufficient consent to finalize the adoption or that
Defendant Pat B. Brian was too busy with other cases or
otherwise occupied with becoming a judge to spend the
time necessary to finalize the adoption.

2.

Whether Defendant Pat Brian was required to comp
the Interstate Compact Act and failed to do so.

3.

Whether Defendant Pat Brian failed to inform the
Plaintiffs that he would not obtain the written consent
of the natural mother, but would rely upon the theory of
abandonment in order to finalize the adoption of the

8

ti

minor child by the Plaintiffs.
4.

Whether Defendant Pat Brian placed the minor child in the
physical custody of the Plaintiffs stating that the child
was now theirs and to take the child and raise it as
their own.

5.

Whether Defendant Pat Brian did not contact the natural
mother to obtain her consent or finalize the adoption
from the birth of the minor child until after being
required to do so by the Plaintiffs in order to finalize
the adoption.

6.

Whether Defendant Pat Brian attempted to use Alden Porter
and Richard Stowe to influence and/or coerce the
Plaintiffs to drop their law suit.

7.

Whether Defendant Pat Brian, through co-Defendant Nielsen
& Senior, contacted the FBI representatives and SBA
representatives in order to pressure Plaintiffs into
dropping their suit against the Defendant Pat B. Brian.

Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all
bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.
v

Eckle, supra.

Generally, conduct

Samms

is outrageous where

the

recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would
arouse his resentment against the actor and lead him to exclaim
"outrageous".

The conduct of Pat Brian would lead any member of

the community to exclaim "outrageous" and arouse his resentment
against the Defendant Pat Brian.
Defendant Pat Brian's actions are extreme and intolerable. To
have placed a child in the physical custody of prospective adoptive
parents without informing them that the natural mother may not give
her consent to the adoption and that after bonding with the child,

9

the

adoptive

parents

may

loose

that

child

intolerable conduct on behalf of the Defendant.

is

extreme

and

Also, Defendant

Pat Brian, being an attorney, was in a position of authority over
the Plaintiffs.

He was xequired to understand the law of adoption

and by informing the Plaintiffs that the child was theirs and to
take the child home and to raise that child as one of their own and
that there were no problems with the adoption, he used his position
to place the Plaintiffs in a position where they may loose their
adoptive daughter while believing that the Defendant had performed
all the work that he was required to perform as their attorney,
which included obtaining the consent of the natural mother and
father and complying with all statutory requirements in order for
the adoption to be finalized.
Therefore, there is an issue of material fact as to whether or
not the Defendants conduct was outrageous.

B.

THE DEFENDANTS INTENT TO CAUSE OR THE RECKLESS DISREGARD OF
PROBABILITY OF CAUSING EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.
There are issues of material

fact as to whether or not

Defendant Pat Brian intended to cause or recklessly disregarded the
probability of causing emotional distress to the Plaintiffs.

The

issues of material fact are:
1.

Whether Defendant Pat Brian totally disregarded the
bonding between the Plaintiffs and the minor child.
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2.

Whether Defendant Pat Brian placed the minor child in the
physical possession of the Defendants stating that the
child was now theirs and to take the child home and raise
it as their own.

3.

Whether Defendant Pat Brian placed the minor child in the
physical custody of the Plaintiffs without informing them
that he would not seek the written consent of the natural
mother but would finalize the adoption on the theory of
abandonment
and
Defendant
failed
to
inform
the
Plaintiffs, after having the child in their physical
custody that after caring for and loving the child and
bonding to that child for a period of a year or more
could loose that minor child if abandonment on the part
of the natural mother could not be shown.

4.

Whether Defendant Pat B. Brian and/or others representing
him contacted the FBI and SBA causing further financial
concerns and further Court proceedings to the Plaintiffs
with the express intent to discourage the Plaintiffs from
continuing to proceed with their law suit against the
Defendant.

5.

Whether Defendant Pat Brian and/or others representing
him contacted church authorities to influence the
Plaintiffs to dismiss their suit against the Defendant.

The Defendant is most clearly liable where he acts with the
purpose of inflicting emotional distress.

Samms v Eccles, supra.

Even where the ultimate purpose is impersonal, such as infliction
of emotional distress for the purpose of debt collection, if the
intent of the result of the conduct is mental suffering, the
Defendant will be found liable.
16,

273

S.W.2d

64

(1954).

Duty v General Fin. Co., 154 Tex.
Certainly

the contacting

of

the

representatives of the FBI and SBA and the representatives of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints by Pat Brian and/or his

11
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representatives was an intentional act performed by the Defendant
with the intent to cause the Plaintiffs mental
persuade them to dismiss their law suit.

suffering and

Defendants acts in

informing others that the Plaintiffs had been involved in many law
suits

is also an act by Defendant

Plaintiffs

mental

suffering

dismiss their law suit.

and

to deliberately

influenced

the

cause the

Plaintiffs

to

Defendant's acts to use the Plaintiffs

name and to have the names made public is also a deliberate act by
Defendant to cause Plaintiffs mental suffering and influence the
Plaintiffs to dismiss their law suit.

See Attached Exhibit A

attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference.
Reckless or wanton behavior may also result in liability
whether the Defendants acts and deliberate disregard of a high
degree of probability that the emotional distress will follow.
Restatement 2d of Torts, Section 46, comment I (1964). There is no
question that any reasonable person would have known that emotional
distress would result where Plaintiffs were suddenly confronted or
threatened with the loss of their adoptive daughter.

The loss of

an adoptive daughter is akin to the death of a natural child.

Any

reasonable person would have known that emotional distress would
result from the death of a natural child.

See Affidavit of Dr.

Ralph Gant marked as Exhibit B attached hereto and incorporated
herein by this reference.
12

All of the actions of the Defendant show that he intended to
cause emotional distress or that he recklessly disregarded the
probability of causing emotional distress to the Plaintiffs.

C.
Restatement

2d

SEVERE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.
of

Torts

defines

emotional

including all highly unpleasant mental reactions.
of Torts, Section 46, Comment J (1964).

distress

as

Restatement 2d

The California Supreme

Court has held that mental suffering includes nervousness, grieff
anxietyf

worry,

physical pain.

shockf

humiliation, and

indignity

as well as

Criscy v Security Ins. Co. of New Haven, Conn*, 66

Cal.2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal.Rptr. 13 (1967).

Restatement 2d

of Torts further states that the law intervenes only where the
distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be
expected to endure it.
Comment J (1964).

Restatement 2d of Torts, Section 46,

This requirement of severity helps to ensure

that the harm alleged by the Plaintiff is real.

Nevertheless, in

Utah the cause of action for emotional distress exists even where
the Plaintiffs mental suffering is not accompanied by bodily impact
or physical injury.

Samms v Eccles, supra.

There are issues of material fact regarding the severity of
the emotional distress of the Plaintiffs.
1.

The issues are:

Whether the Plaintiffs suffer from Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder.
13
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2.

Whether Plaintiffs have been unable to live a normal life
by living in constant paranoia, nausea, fear, etc.

3.

Whether Plaintiffs have been unable to function as a
result of the actions of the Defendant. Plaintiff James
Johnson has been unable to obtain a meaningful position
in order to support his family.
Plaintiff Jennifer
Johnson has been unable to care for her family, to
provide for them the motherly love and attention that
they require. See Exhibit B , Affidavit of James Johnson
marked as Exhibit C attached hereto and incorporated
herein by reference and Affidavit of Jennifer Johnson
marked as Exhibit D attached hereto and incorporated
herein by reference.

It is quite clear from the Affidavits of Dr. Gant that the
Plaintiffs

suffer

from

severe

emotional

distress,

that

Post

Traumatic Stress Syndrome and major depression are clearly severe
emotional distress.

D.

AN ACTUAL OR PROXIMATE CAUSAL LINK BETWEEN THE TORTUOUS
CONDUCT AND THE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.

There is a dispute of material facts as to whether there is an
actual or proximate casual link between the tortuous conduct of the
Defendant and the emotional distress suffered by the Plaintiffs.
The issues are:
1.

Whether Defendants
they may loose the
in their physical
Defendant that the
the child home and

failure to inform the Plaintiffs that
child after the child had been placed
custody and being informed by the
child was theirs and they should take
raise it as their own.

2.

Whether the emotional distress of the Defendants began
with the learning by Plaintiffs that the child that had
been in their possession for nearly one year and they

14

believed to be their own could be taken from their
possession at any time and that the natural mother did
have the right to take that child from their possession.
3.

Whether Defendant Pat Brian failed to inform the
Plaintiffs at any time that the Plaintiffs may loose the
custody of the minor child and that the natural mother
had full right to take the child from their custody and
raise the child.

Verdicts for personal injuries will not be sustained where
there is no expert medical testimony establishing causation,

W.

Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, Section 12 at 51, n. 40 (4th
Ed. 1971).

Dr. Gant states that the emotional distress suffered by

the Plaintiffs is caused by the threatened loss of the adoptive
daughter of the Plaintiffs.
There is no question that Defendant Pat Brian's conduct caused
the emotional distress of the Plaintiffs.

POINT III
REASONABLE MEN MAY DIFFER AS TO WHETHER DEFENDANT PAT B. BRIAN
IS LIABLE FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.

DISCUSSION
Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury subject to
the control of the court to determine whether in the particular
case the conduct has been sufficiently outrageous to result in
liability.

Gvai v Storch, 28 Utah 2d 399, 503 P.2d 449, 450

15

(1972).

Quoting Restatement of Torts 2d, Section 46, h. The facts

in this matter support the assertion that reasonable men could
differ as to whether the conduct of Defendant was so outrageous and
extreme

that

it offended

decency and morality.

the generally

accepted

standards of

Certainly, there is a dispute as to whether

or not the Defendant intentionally or with reckless disregard
failed to obtain the consent of the natural mother and placed the
minor child in the custody of the Plaintiffs, assuring them that
the child was theirs and to take the child home and raise it as
their

own

and

contacting

FBI

representatives

and

SBA

representatives and church representatives in order to influence
the Plaintiffs to dismiss their lawsuit against the Defendants.

CONCLUSION
Since there are issues of material facts, the Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment should be denied.

"day of January, 1992.

DARWlN^Cr-FISHER
~"
Attorney for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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I hereby certify that I personally mailed a copy of the
foregoing on this $**•

day of xj^^jfOftfl

, 199^by

first-class, U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Judge Pat B. Brian
c/o Mark Dowdle
915 W. 100 S.
Salt Lake City, UT

84104

Arthur Nielsen
Larry Whyte
Nielsen & Senior
60 E. South Temple #1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Chris Schmutz
3760 South Highland Drive, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah

\clientdf\johnBon\memoran4.opp
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Arthur II. Nielsen (A2405)
Larry L. Whyte (4942)
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen & Senior
60 East South Temple
Eagle Gate Tower, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone No.:

(801) 532-1900

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES A. JOHNSON and JENNIFER
L. JOHNSON,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No.:

NIELSEN Si SENIOR, a Utah
corporation; PAT B. BRIAN, and
CHRIS L. SCIIMUTZ,

900400460CN

Judge VeNoy Christoffersen

Defendants.

Defendant
Memorandum

in

Nielsen

& Senior

Support

of

its

hereby
Motion

submits
to

the

Dismiss

or

following
in

the

Alternative for Partial Summary Judgment as to the Fifth Claim
for

Relief

for

negligent

misrepresentation

as

contained

in

Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint.
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

In January 1986, Plaintiffs retained Defendant Nielsen

& Senior and Pat B. Brian in a private adoption matter.

1H06
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2.

On or about June 27, 1986, Plaintiffs obtained custody

of the infant child.
3.

From June 27, 1986 to date, the infant child has been

in the continuous care and custody of Plaintiffs.
4.

The natural mother did

not give her

formal written

consent as required by Jaw to Plaintiffs' adoption of the infant
child until October 1987.
5.

In JuJy J 987, the natural mother initiated a Habeas

Corpus proceeding allegedly for the purpose of regaining custody
of the infant child.
6.

In July 1987, Plaintiffs retained a new law firm in the

private adoption matter.
7.

Ln October

1987, the natural mother gave her formal

written consent to the adoption and Plaintiffs' adoption of the
infant child was finalized.
8.

In June 1990, Plaintiffs initiated the instant action

against this Defendant and others.
9.

Pursuant

to

order

of

this

Court, discovery

cut-off

period is December 30, 1991.
10.

The allegations contained

in Plaintiffs' Fifth Claim

are not stated with particularity.
11.
supporting

No

evidence

has

been

Plaintiffs' Fifth Claim

allegations contained therein.
ARGUMENT

11406

-2-

produced
for Relief

establishing
or

any

of

or
the

A•

ElaLilLfci ffsj

Fifth

Claim

for

Relief

for

Negligent

Misrepresentation should be Dismissed.
Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
"In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity
. . . ."

This requirement, that circumstances constituting fraud

shall be stated with particularity includes not only allegations
of common law fraud, of which negligent misrepresentation is an
outgrowth,
alleges

but

the

reaches

kind

of

all

circumstances

misrepresentations,

where

the

omissions,

pleader
or

other

deceptions covered by the term "fraud" in its broadest dimension.
Williams v. State Farm Insurance Co., 656, P.2d 966 (Utah 1982).
It is undisputed that the averments contained within Plaintiffs'
Fifth Claim

for Relief

for negligent misrepresentation do not

contain the basic facts required by Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, and are not set forth with the requisite
particularity.

Therefore, Defendant Nielsen & Senior is entitled

to an order dismissing Plaintiffs' Fifth Claim for Relief as a
matter of law.

Ileathman v. Hatch, 13 Utah 2d. 266, 372 P.2d 990

(1962) .
B.

Defendant Nielsen & Senior is Entitled to Partial Summary
Judgment as a Matter of Law.
It

has

long

been

recognized

that

the

major

purpose

of

summary judgment is to avoid an unnecessary trial by allowing the
parties to pierce the pleadings to determine whether there is a

1U06
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lie;

genuine issue to present to the fact finder.

Reagan Outdoor

Advertising, Inc. v. Lunduren, 692 P.2d 776 (Utah 1984).
The ULali Supreme Court in Christenson v. Commonwealth Land
Title Insurance Company, 666 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah 1983) set forth
the required elements to establish negligent misrepresentation.
Negligent misrepresentation is a tort which grew out of
common-law fraud.
We defined it in Jardine v.
Brunswick Corp., 18 Utah 2d. 378, 381, 423 P.2d 659,
662 (1967)f as follows:
Where (1) one having a
pecuniary interest in a transaction, (2) is in a
superior position to know material facts, and (3)
carelessly or negligently makes a false representation
concerning them, and (4) expecting the other party to
rely and act thereon, and (5) the other party
reasonably does so, and (6) suffers loss in that
transaction, the representor can be held responsible if
the other elements of
fraud are also present.
[Subdivision added.] (Emphasis added.)
See Masters v. Worsely, 777 P. 2d 499 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), for
the other elements required to establish fraud.
The discovery period expires today.

To date, no evidence

has been forthcoming to support Plaintiffs' claim of negligent
misrepresentation, or any of the allegations contained
Plaintiffs' Fifth Claim for Relief.
been

forthcoming,

and,

in

fact,

within

Furthermore, no evidence has
none

exists

to

support

or

demonstrate the existence of the required elements of negligent
misrepresentation as set forth above.
entitled

to partial

summary

As a result, Defendant is

judgment as to Plaintiffs' Fifth

Claim for Relief as a matter of law, inasmuch as it is clear from
the undisputed

facts, answers to interrogatories, depositions,

and all other discovery, that Plaintiffs are unable to prevail on

1H06

-4-

said cause of action.

See Condor v. A.L. Williams & Associates,

739 P.2d 634 (Utah Ct. App. 1907); Bray Lines v. Utah Carriers,
liic^, 739 P.2d 115 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

Aird Insurance Agency

y__. Zions First National Bank, 612 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980).
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs

have failed

sufficiently

to plead

Claim for Relief of negligent misrepresentation.

their Fifth

However, even

if properly pleaded, no evidence exists to support said claim or
any

of

the

required

elements

thereof.

Therefore,

Defendant

Nielsen & Senior submits that it is entitled to an order either
dismissing Plaintiffs' Fifth Claim for Relief or for an order of
partial summary judgment in its favor against the Plaintiffs on
Plaintiffs' Fifth Claim for Relief and respectfully requests that
this Court enter an order to that effect.
DATED this <^l)

day of December, 1991.

,a

Arthur H. Nielsen, %sq.
Larry L. Whyte, Esq.
of Nielsen & Senior, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
Nielsen & Senior
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Arthur H. Nielsen (A2405)
Larry L. Whyte (4942)
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen & Senior
60 East South Temple
Eagle Gate Tower, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone No.:

DEC
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(801) 532-1900

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES A. JOHNSON and JENNIFER
L. JOHNSON,
Plaintiffs,
v.
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah
corporation; PAT B. BRIAN, and
CHRIS L. SCHMUTZ,

)
)
)
)
)

DEFENDANT NIELSEN & SENIOR'S
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS'
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No.:

900400460CN

]
Judge VeNoy Christoffersen

Defendants.

Defendant Nielsen & Senior submits the following Reply to
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.
DISPUTED STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant Nielsen & Senior disputes Plaintiffs' Statement of
Undisputed Facts as follows:
No. 3 -

Pat Brian was an employee, but was not a principal
of Nielsen & Senior during 1986.

1 1296
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No. 5 -

Defendants did obtain the consent of the natural
mother to the adoption prior to the birth of the
minor

child.

Thereafter,

despite

Defendants'

attempts, the natural mother refused to give her
written

consent

to

the

adoption

of

the

minor

child, until the matter was settled by the payment
to the natural mother of more money.
No. 6 -

Defendants,
natural

not

knowing

father,

certificate

obtained,

from

the

the

identity

in

January,

Utah

State

of

the

1987, a

Department

of

Health certifying that no notice of paternity had
been

filed

by

any

person

claiming

to

be

the

natural father of the minor child.
No. 7 -

Defendants

contacted

both

the

Interstate Compact Directors.

Utah

and

Texas

The requirements of

the Interstate Compact Act were ultimately waived
upon

the

request

of

the

Utah

Director

of

the

Interstate Compact, William Ward.

ARGUMENT
I.
PLAINTIFFS MAY NOT AS A MATTER OF LAW, MAINTAIN A CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.
In 1980, the Utah Supreme Court in Johnson v. Rodger^, 763
P. 2d 771, 782 (Utah 1988) recognized that a cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress could be maintained,
-21 1296
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within the parameters of Section 313 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts (1965).

To recover under Section 313, Plaintiffs must

plead and prove that: (1) they witnessed a physical an injury to
a

closely

related

person;

(2)

they

suffered

mental

anguish

manifested as a physical injury; and (3) they were within the
zone-of-danger so as to be subject to an unreasonable risk of
bodily harm created by defendant's negligence.
assertions,

Plaintiffs

have

not

met

any

Contrary to their
of

these

three

requirements.
In

adopting

Section

313

of

the

Restatement

(Second) of

Torts, the Utah Supreme Court in Johnson analyzed and rejected
other theories of recovery for negligent infliction of emotional
distress.
analyzed

See Johnson at pp. 780-82.

Specifically, the court

the case of Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital, 27

Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980) and rejected
it.
Plaintiffs are unable as a matter of fact and law, to meet
the criterion set forth in Section 313.

Clearly the case law of

Utah does not allow the maintenance of a cause of action for
emotional distress or the recovery of damages therefore except in
the

limited

circumstances

set

forth

in

those

circumstances do not exist in the instant action.
claims

for

recovery

of

damages

for

emotional

cases,

which

Plaintiffs'
distress

are

squarely contrary to Utah law and should be summarily rejected by
this Court.
-31 1296
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II.
PLAINTIFFS MAY NOT RECOVER DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.
The case of Lambert v. _aine, 123 Utah 145, 256 P.2d 241
(1953) is distinguishable from the instant action.

Lambert v.

Sine involved intentional not negligent conduct or wrong.
Supreme

Court,

following

previously

established

The

guidelines,

properly awarded damages for emotional distress, although it is
interesting to note they awarded only $250.
Plaintiffs' use of and citation to California authority to
support their theory of recovery for emotional distress damages
absent any physical injuries, is further misplaced for at least
two reasons: First and

foremost, the case of Tara Motors v.

Jasper, 226 Cal. App. 3d 640, 276 Cal, Rptr. 603 (1990), simply
follows the earlier California decision of Molien, supra, which
was affirmatively rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in Johnson,
supra.

It should

be noted

that

the Utah Supreme Court, as

recently as 1990, followed Johnson v. Rodgers in holding that a
plaintiff's failure to met the standard enunciated in Section 313
would

bar

distress.

recovery

for

negligent

infliction

of

emotional

£eg Dalley v, Utah^Valley Regional Medical Ctr>, 791

P.2d 193, 201 (Utah 1990).

See also Hhite V> Blackburn, 787 P.2d

1315, 1318 (Utah App. 1990).
Second, Plaintiffs use of and citation to JuDay v. Rotunno &
Rotunno,

2 76

Cal.

Rptr.

445

(1990)

is

inappropriate.

The

California Supreme Court entered an order on April 25, 1991, that
-411296
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Lhe JuDay opinion not be officially published

and Plaintiffs'

citation to it is in violation of California Rules of Court, Rule
977, and Rule 4-500 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration
both of which prohibit use or citation of unpublished opinions
absent circumstances not present in this case.

Since the JuDay

opinion has no precedential value it should be ignored.
Even if this Court were to follow California law on this
issue, it is also significant to note that the very case upon
which Plaintiffs rely, Tar a Motors, supra, in n. 5 at p. 609,
stated that in a legal malpractice action, emotional distress
damages

were

not

recoverable

for

breach

of

contract.

Specifically, the court stated:
We do not reach [appellee's] somewhat novel argument
emotiona] distress damages are recoverable for breach
of contract. Nonetheless, we note that we have found
no authority which supports her contention. Indeed, in
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., (1988) 47 Cal. 3d 654,
666-60, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373, upon which
she relies, the Supreme Court took great care in
drawing the distinction between contract-based causes
of action, for which only contract remedies are
available, and causes of action based upon the breach
of obligations imposed by law for which traditional
tort remedies are available.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and for the reasons set forth in
Defendants'

Memorandum

in

Support

of

its

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment, Defendant Nielsen & Senior respectfully requests this
Court

to

grant

its

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

as

to

the

Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action in its Second Amended Complaint
-51 1 296
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for negligent infliction of

emotional distress and for all the

emotional distress damages or associated damages.
DATED this

5"

da

y

of

December, 1991.

QAZJU^J

rfYUU^

Arthur H. Nielsen
Larry L. Whyte
of Nielsen & Senior, P.C.
Counsel for Defendant Nielsen & Senior

CERTIFJICAXE OF SERVICE
I liereby certify that on the x<JLL. day of Decemberf 1991, I
served upon Plaintiffs a true and correct copy of the foregoing
DEFENDANT NIELSEN & SENIOR'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT by
causing the same to be hand delivered to the following:
Darwin C. Fisher, Esq.
NIELSON, HILL & FISHER
3319 N. University #200
Provo, Utah 84604
Michael L. Dowdle, Esq.
915 West 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104
Chris L. Schmutz, Esq,
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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Michael L. Dowdle, Esq. (4025)
Attorney for Defendants
915 West 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104
Telephone:
(801)531-0060

V\

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JAMES A. JOHNSON and JENNIFER
L. JOHNSON,

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGEMENT

Plaintiffs,

vs

Civil No. 900400

NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah
Corporation, PAT B. BRIAN and
CHRIS L. SCHMUTZ,

Judge Venoy Christoffersen

Defendants,

Defendant Pat B. Brian, by and through counsel in pursuant to
Rule 56 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for an order
granting partial summary judgement in favor of Defendant Brian and
against Plaintiff's as to Plaintiff's Fourth Claim for Relief for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
This motion is based upon the fact that Defendant Brian is
entitled to judgement as a matter of law and that no genuine as to
any material fact exists with respect to such claim for relief.
This motion is supported by the Affidavit of Pat B. Brian and the
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for

Michael L. Dowdle, Esq. (4025)
Attorney for Defendants
915 West 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104
Telephone: (801)531-0060

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JAMES A. JOHNSON and JENNIFER
L. JOHNSON,
Plaintiffs,

JOINDER IN MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGEMENT

%0

vs

Civil No. 9004004-eClT

NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah
Corporation, PAT B. BRIAN and
CHRIS L. SCHMUTZ,

Judge VeNoy Christoffersen

Defendants.
Defendant, Pat B. Brian, by and through counsel, hereby joins
in the motion for Partial Summary Judgement dated November 8,
1991, filed by Defendant Nielson and Senior, seeking summary
Judgement dismissing Plaintiff's Third Claim for Relief for
negligent affliction of emotional distress as well as summary
judgement denying all damages associated with or arising out of
any claim for emotional distress.
Defendant Pat B. Brian further joins in and adopts the
reasoning and authorities set forth the Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Partial Summary Judgement, dated November 8, 1991,
filed by Nielson and Senior in s«.| p^rt of its motion.

Partial Summary Judgement filed herewith, as well as the second
Affidavit of Mark J. Howard previously filed in this matter.
DATED this

day of December, 1991,

c

(lliduSi •

ZL

Michael L. Dowdlej Esq.
Attorney for Defendant,
Pat B. Brian
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DATED this

2*A
'

day of December, 1991

ik

n

Z

Michael L. Dowdle, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
Pat B. Brian
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Darwin C. Fisher, Bar No. 1080
Attorney for Plaintiff
Jamestown Square, Suite 200
3319 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-6600
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES A. JOHNSON and
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON,

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
NEILSON & SENIOR, a Utah
Corporation, PAT B. BRIAN,
and CHRIS L. SCHMUTZ,

Civil No. 900400460CN
Judge VeNoy Christofferson

Defendants.
Plaintiffs, James A. Johnson and Jennifer L. Johnson, hereby
submit the following Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant, Neilson
& Senior's, Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Plaintiffs'
third

claim

for relief

for negligent

infliction of

emotional

distress as well as all damages associated with or arising out of
any claim for emotional distress.

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

In January, 1986, Plaintiffs retained Defendant Neilson &

Senior in a private adoption matter.
2.

On or about June 27, 1986, Plaintiffs obtained physical

custody of the infant child from Pat Brian.
3.

Pat B. Brian was a principal and employee of Defendant

Neilson & Senior during 1986 and through May 1987.
4.

From June 27, 1986, three days after the birth of the

minor child to the present time, the infant child has been in the
continuous care and physical custody of Plaintiffs.
5.

Defendant failed to obtain the consent of the natural

mother for the adoption of the minor child.
6.

Defendant failed to obtain the consent of the natural

father to the adoption of the child by Plaintiffs and failed to
take any action to prevent the natural father from exercising his
rights to the minor child.
7.

Defendant failed to comply with the Interstate Compact

8.

In approximately July 1987, the Plaintiffs sought the

Act.

legal services of another law firm and attorney, Mark Robinson.
9.

In July 1987, the natural mother initiated a habeas corpus

proceeding for the purpose of gaining physical custody of the
infant child.
10.

In October, 1987, the natural mother gave her consent to

the adoption and Plaintiffs' adoption of the infant child was
finalized.
11.

In June 1990, Plaintiffs initiated a malpractice action

against defendant Neilson & Senior and others.

ISSUE I

WHETHER PLAINTIFFS• CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CANNOT BE MAINTAINED AS A MATTER OF LAW.

LAW
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress to
another, he is subject to liability to the other for resulting
illness or bodily harm if the actor:
(a) Should have realized that his conduct involved an
unreasonable risk of causing the distress, otherwise than
by knowledge of the harm or peril of a third person; and
(b) From facts known to him should have realized that the
distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or
bodily harm.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) has no application to
illness or bodily harm of another which is caused by emotional
distress arising solely from harm or peril to a third person,
unless the negligence of the actor has otherwise created an
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the other.

POINT I
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL HARM IS AN INDEPENDENT CAUSE
OF ACTION RECOGNIZED IN THE STATE OF UTAH.
ARGUMENT
Utah

recognizes

a

broad

protected

interest

in

mental

tranquility, Johnson v. Rogers, 763, P.2d, 771, (Utah 1980), citing
Jeppesen v. Jensen, 47 Utah 536, 155 P 429 (1960).

Utah courts

further recognize that an independent cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional harm exists in the State of Utah. Johnson,
supra.
Utah courts have abandoned the "impact" rule and have adopted
3

the "zone of danger" rule set forth in the Restatement of Torts, 2d
1018 (1965).

In addition, the court in Johnson has made it clear

that other approaches will be considered:
"at some future date, we may determine that there is merit
in some of the other approaches surveyed in Justice Durham's
opinion. However, until we have had experience with the cause
of action, I conclude that it is best to take the more
conservative approach and adopt the restatement rule as
written." Johnson, supra at 785.
To establish a cause of action under Section 313 (1) of the
Restatement 2d of Torts (1965), the Plaintiff must show:
1.

That Defendant unintentionally caused emotional distress
to Plaintiff;

2.

That Defendant should have realized that its conduct
involved an unreasonable risk of causing the emotional
distress; and

3. That from the facts known to Defendant, Defendant
should have realized that the distress might result in
illness or bodily harm.

This rule applies only where Defendant's negligent conduct
threatens Plaintiff with emotional distress likely to result in
bodily

harm

disturbance.

or

illness

because

of

Plaintiff's

emotional

Restatement 2nd of Torts, section 313, note d.

In addition, Plaintiff may be the direct victim and need not be a
bystander witnessing an injury to a third party. Restatement 2d of
Torts, section 313.
Plaintiffs may maintain their cause of action under Section
313 (1) of the Restatement 2nd of Torts, (1965).
4

Plaintiffs suffer

from Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome caused by the negligent actions
of Defendants in failing to obtain the consent of the natural
mother and fulfill the requirements of the Interstate Compact Act
in order to promptly finalize the adoption of the minor child by
the Plaintiffs.

Defendants, by delivering the minor child to the

Plaintiffs in June 1986f and allowing the child and the Plaintiffs
to bond for a period in excess of one year, should have realized
that

their

conduct

involved

an

unreasonable

emotional distress to the Plaintiffs

risk

of

causing

when Plaintiffs discovered

that the adoption had not been finalized, the consent of the
natural mother had not been obtained, and that the natural mother
still had legal rights to the minor child.

Certainly Defendants,

having been frequently informed of the bonding taking place between
the Plaintiffs and the minor child, should have realized that the
Plaintiff's emotional distress, upon learning of the Defendant's
negligence, might have resulted in illness and even bodily harm.
Plaintiffs are the clients of the Defendant.

They are direct

victims and as such are entitled to maintain their cause of action
for

negligent

infliction

of

emotional

distress

against

the

Defendant.
In addition, Plaintiffs may maintain an independent cause of
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress under Section
436(1) Restatement 2d of Torts (1965).

Section 436(1) applies to

situations where the Defendant's negligent conduct causes emotional
distress but not the bodily harm which results from the emotional
5

distress.

In order for Defendant to be liable to Plaintiff,

Plaintiff must show:
1. That the Defendant's conduct is negligent as violating a
duty of care to protect Plaintiff from emotional distress; and
2. Defendant should have recognized his conduct as involving
an unreasonable risk of bodily harm.
The fact that the emotional harm results solely through the
internal operation of the emotional distress does not protect
Defendant from liability.
Defendant's

conduct

Subsection (1) is applicable only where

is intended

or obviously

likely to cause

emotional distressf although not intended to cause the bodily harm
which results from it.

Restatement 2d of Tortsf Section 436 n.a.

This rule applies where Defendant intends to subject or should
realize Plaintiff is likely to be subjected to emotional distress
so severe that a reasonable man would realize the likelihood that
might produce harmful physical consequences•
"Where such a duty exists, it would be deprived of all
sanction and the purpose for which it was imposed would be
defeated if recovery were denied because the harm was
sustained solely through the operation of emotional distress."
Section 436, Restatement 2nd of Torts, (1965)
Plaintiffs
negligent

may

infliction

also
of

maintain

their

emotional

Restatement 2nd of Torts (1965).

cause

distress

of

under

action

for

Section

436

Defendants failed to obtain the

consent of the natural mother, to fulfill the requirements of the
Interstate

Compact

Plaintiffs

from

Act,

emotional

and

as

a

distress.

6

result

failed

Defendants

to

protect

should

have

recognized

that

his

failure

to

properly

handle

the

adoption

proceedings involved an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the
Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs

As
have

a

result

suffered

of
from

Defendant's

negligent

sleeplessness,

tears,

actions,
loss

of

appetite, anxiety, headaches, fear of loss of the family, etc,
depressions and Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome. Though transitory
non-recurring physical phenomena, harmless in themselves, such as
dizziness, vomiting, and the like, do not make the Defendants
liable, when such phenomena are in themselves inconsequential and
do not amount to any substantial bodily harm, long continued nausea
or headaches may amount to physical illness which is bodily harm.
And even long continued mental disturbances, such as in the case of
repeated hysterical attacks or mental aberration may be classified
by the courts as illness, notwithstanding their mental character.
This becomes a medical or psychiatric problem rather than one of
law.

Restatement 2nd of Torts, Section 436 (a) (1969) n.c.

ISSUE II
WHETHER PLAINTIFFS
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.

ARE

ENTITLED

TO

RECOVER

DAMAGES

FOR

LAW
MENTAL PAIN AND SUFFERING IN CONNECTION WITH A WRONG WHICH, APART
FROM SUCH PAIN AND SUFFERING CONSTITUTES A CAUSE OF ACTION, IS A
PROPER ELEMENT OF DAMAGES WHERE IT IS A NATURAL AND PROXIMATE
CONSEQUENCE OF THE WRONG. Lambert v. Sine, 123 UT 145, 150, 256
P.2d 241, 244 (1953)

7

POINT I
PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES WHICH ARE A NATURAL
OR PROXIMATE CONSEQUENCE OF DEFENDANTS' MALPRACTICE.

DISCUSSION
Legal malpractice constitutes both a tort and a breach of
contract.

When an attorney breaches a duty owed to his clientf he

is liable for all damages directly and proximately caused by his
act or failure to act.

Williams v. Barber, 765 P.2d 887 (Utah

1988) .
In Lambert v. Sine, supra, the Utah courts recognize mental
pain and suffering to be an element of damage where:
1.

It is a natural and proximate consequence of the
Defendant's wrongful act, and

2.

There is a cause of action that exists apart from the pain
and suffering.

Plaintiffs have a cause of action for breach of contract as
well as a cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional
distress. The emotional distress suffered by Plaintiffs is clearly
a natural and proximate consequence of Defendant's wrongful acts.
Further, Defendants breached the attorney-client contract with
Plaintiffs by failing to obtain the consent of the natural mother
and natural father, failing to comply with Interstate Compact Act,
and failing to file a petition for adoption.
Rotunno, No. B040006

JuDav v Rotunno &

(Cal. App.2d App. Dist. Div. 7, Dec. 10,
8

1990).

Tara Moters v. Superior Ct.r No, D012620, (Cal. App. 4th

App. Dist. Div. One, Dec. 21, 1990).
Clearly the emotional distress suffered by Plaintiffs upon
learning that they did not have the legal right to keep the minor
child was foreseeable.

Plaintiffs had the minor child in their

home for more than one year prior to learning that they did not
have the legal right to keep the minor child and Plaintiff's family
had bonded with the minor chiJd and had cared for, nurtured, and
financially supported the minor child.
Recovery of damages for mental suffering has been permitted
for

breach

of

contract

which

directly

concerns

the comfort,

happiness or personal esteem of one of the parties.

Crisci v

Security Insurance Company of New Haven, Conn., 426 P.2d 173, 58
Cal. Rptr. 13, 66 C.2d 425 (1967).
as an element

of damages

To support emotional distress

in a breach

of contract case, the

Plaintiff must show Defendants:
1.

Intentional conduct; or

2.

Wanton or reckless conduct; and

3.
Defendant must have reason to know when the contract was
made, that the breach of the contract would cause mental
suffering for reasons other than pecuniary loss.
Thomas v French, 638 P.2d 613, 30 Wash App. 811, review
granted, reverse 659 P.2d 1097, 99 Wash 2d 95 (1981).
The actions of the Defendant in failing to exercise the skill,
prudence and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity
commonly possess and exercise in the performance of finalizing an
adoption is certainly wanton or reckless conduct and perhaps rises
9

to the level of intentional conduct. Certainly, the Defendants had
reason to know, when the contract was made, that a breach would
cause mental suffering by the Plaintiffs for reasons other than
pecuniary loss.
Therefore,

Defendant's

negligent

infliction

of

emotional

distress is a proper element of damages.

CONCLUSION
The "impact" rule is no longer applicable in the State of
Utah. The Utah courts have adopted the "zone of danger" rule which
does allow for an independent cause of action for the Negligent
InfJiction of Emotional Distress. Plaintiffs clearly have met the
criteria

set

forth

in

Section

Restatement 2nd of Torts (1965).
their

cause

of

action

for

313

and

Section

436

of

the

As such Plaintiffs may maintain

negligent

infliction

of

emotional

distress and Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment should
be denied.
It is also well established in Utah that mental pain and
suffering is a proper element of damages in legal malpractice
cases.

Therefore, Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment
"T~

should be denied.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

10

J

day of December, 1991.

Arthur H. Nielsen, USB No. A2405
Larry L. Whyte, USB No. 4942
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen
& Senior
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:

(801) 532-1900

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES A. JOHNSON and JENNIFER
L. JOHNSON,

|
|

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah
Corporation, PAT B. BRIAN
and CHRIS L. SCHMUTZ,
Defendants.

i Civil No. 900400460CN
Judge VeNoy Christoffersen
]

Defendant Nielsen & Senior hereby moves this Court for an
Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment in favor of Defendant
Nielsen & Senior and against Plaintiffs as to Plaintiffs' Third
Claim for Relief for negligent infliction of emotional distress,
as well as all damages associated with or arising out of any
claim for emotional distress.
Defendants are entitled to Summary Judgment as to this claim
for relief as a matter of law.

This Motion is supported by the

accompanying Memorandum.

1060

DATED this ^^S

day of November, 1991.

Arthur/H". Nielsen
Larry L. Whyte
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this X*-^ day of November, 1991, I
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, by causing the same to be mailed,
postage prepaid, to the following:
Darwin C. Fisher, Esq.
/ //
/\
NIELSON, HILL & FISHER C//W"</e//'Mr^J
3319 N. University #200
Provo, Utah 84604
Michael L. Dowdle, Esq.
915 West 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104
Chris L. Schmutz, Esq.
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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